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As Alan M. Cohen, Editor of this supplement, notes in his introductory
editorial, this issue had its genesis at the annual meeting of the S.S.S.P.
in Montreal. We have made several changes in the content. We have added
papers by Baizerman and Herman. The content of these papers are directly
related to the topic of evaluative research. Space limitations necessitated
the withdrawal of one paper; and since Kronick's paper deals with the Politicking
necessary to establish a social welfare service, we are planning to publish
it in the summer issue.
Norman N. Goroff
Publisher and Managing Editor

EDITORIAL

In August 1974, at the annual meeting of The Society For
The Study of Social Problems, the Sociology and Social Welfare
Division conducted a special session on "evaluative research and
social sciences in welfare policy and programs." Instead of
reading the various papers in their entirety the participants of
this session agreed to briefly overview their papers. The
balance of the session was devoted to a general discussion of
the implications of their work within the context of evaluative
research in the social sciences. This discussion provided the
impetus for this special edition of "Sociology and Social Welfare."
The discussants returned again and again to what was referred to as the "folklore" that evaluative research, demonstration projects and other research techniques are undertaken to provide information that in turn leads to improved services. In
other words, each participant commented on the widely espoused
rationality of linking research findings to the subject being
"researched." The obvious assumption being that if the evaluative
research indicated inadequacies, this information would at least
be seriously considered and would probably lead to changes in
those areas shown by the research to be deficient in some way.
Despite almost universal agreement that actual rationality
in linking research information to program change is exceedingly
RARE, new evaluation studies and research proposals continue to
consume millions of dollars and man hours.
Why?
This special issue includes six papers that address at
least a few of the possible reponses to this question. Harper
and Babigian discuss three distinct types of evaluation. They
-208-

emphasize these distinctions because methods of evaluation are
partly dictated by the intent of the evaluation. The Alissi
paper discusses "some of the issues and problems which arise in
the field of delinquency prevention where there is overriding
public interest and concern and calls for action to prevent
delinquency but where the problem is elusive and where the
variables are not easily isolated and controlled through experimental procedures."
He provides many examples of the problems
of linking research to legislative decision making. Rutnam uses
the famous St. Paul "Family Centred Project" to elaborate on the
incompatibility between the two primary goals of a demonstration
project - evaluating the program and using it as an instrument
of change. Hudson and Crommie outline many of the problems
encountered in the process of conducting evaluation research in
They illustrate through their case
the field of corrections.
material problems involved in planning and conducting evaluative
research. They further illustrate the lack of rationality in
utilizing the findings derived from the project. Kronick uses
the case study of founding a group home to illustrate behind-thescenes politicking necessary to get a project operative. Again,
the lack of rationality in linking information to decision
making is clearly demonstrated. Cohen briefly refers to three
evaluation studies and demonstration projects that fail to link
information to program change. He discusses possible reasons
for this failure and suggests a pre-planning functional information base as an important sequence in creating a more receptive
environment for organizational change.
The special issue of the Journal of Sociology and Social
Welfare does not presume to grapple with all the complexities
surrounding the politics of evaluative research. It is acknowledged that much has already been written about the problems of
evaluation. It is further acknowledged that reasons for the
very limited success of evaluative research to generate useful
organizational change defy a simple clear explanation. However,
it is the hope of the editor that the articles selected for
this special edition will re-emphasize the IRRATIONALITY behind
much of our heightened fervor for "evaluation."
Hopefully this
may further efforts towards closing the irrationality gaps
between program information and organization change.

Alan M. Cohen
Supplement Editor
University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
-fn9-

"CHANGE AND PROGRAM EVALUATION IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS"
Alan M. Cohen
Sociology Department
University of Western Ontario
London Ontario Canada
There is an assumption of an inherent rationality in
linking information on program effectiveness to program change.
This article briefly discusses three typical evaluation studies
and demonstration projects that fail to link information generated on the effectiveness of what people do, to program changes.
Perceived inaccuracy of the information and the perceived threat
of the information are emphasized as two reasons for this
failure of program information to affect change in social organizations. A pre-planning functional information base is proposed
as an important prerequisite in the sequence of creating a more
receptive environment for organizational change.
It is often assumed that information on the effectiveness
of what an organization does will e utilized to improve those
programs. In social organizations these program changes are
expected to provide more effective service to clients. This
assumption of an inherent rationality linking information on
program effectiveness to program change has led o a multitude
of evaluation studies and demonstration projects to provide
information on program effectiveness.
A review of actual cases of evaluative research and demonstration projects often does not substantiate the assumption of
an inherent rationality in linking information to policy formation.
This paper will briefly review three typical case studies
that fail to link newly generated program information to policy
change. It will suggest two major reasons for this failure and
then outline a pre-planning functional information base as an
important prerequisite in creating a more receptive environment
for program information to affect policy changes in social
organizations.
Three typical cases where program information resulting from
evaluation research and demonstration projects failed to affect
program changes:
1.

The original purpose of the St. Paul Minnesota
-210-

"Family Centred Project" was to develop a master
plan for reorganizing health, welfare and recreation
services in American Communities.
(Rutman, 1974:2)
National and international attention to the 1948
and 1954 phases of this project was so extensive
that a 1962 survey found 143 communities in Canada
and the United States had multi-problem families
projects using at least some aspects of the St.
Paul model 3 at some stage of thought, planning or
operation.
Despite this apparent success in elaborating and diseminating new conceptualizations and
case work techniques for multi-problem families,
the Family Centred Project eventually abandoned its
treatment focus. For many reasons, some of which
are elaborated upon in Leonard Rutman's (1974)
paper, the widely publicized information on potential
improvement in service had very limited long range
impact on relevant program change.
2.

A second typical case where relevant program information failed to affect program changes is a
four school study in New York referred to by Kruse
(1968).
This project was undertaken in the 1960's
to ascertain the effect of extensive agency involvement in the schools. All four schools were in
roughly similar circumstances in disadvantaged areas
of New York City. Two of the four schools were
subjected to extensive group and case work involving
both students and their families. The other two
schools were used as control groups. After two years,
the findings indicated there were NO significant
differences in the social problem characteristics of
these two groups. Despite these findings, the usual
agency services continued to operate uninterrupted.

3.

A final example where pertinent information failed to
affect change is a 1970-71 evaluation study on the
relative effects of parole supervision as provided
to a group of juvenile boys and girls (Hudson, 1974).
The major aim of the study was to determine whether
juveniles released from two major state level correctional institutions in Minnesota would adjust as well
on parole without formal supervision from parole
officers, as a corresponding group receiving conventional parole supervision. The research techniques
are elaborated upon in considerable detail in Hudson's
-211-

paper. This study found that exposure to parole
supervision does NOT have a significant positive
effect upon the parole adjustment of juvenile-aged
boys and girls. Hudson (1974:15-16) states "the
major conclusions were included in a summary of
the project which was distributed to all parole
officers, supervisors, and administrators as well
(All these
as to the members of the Parole Board.
groups had extensive involvement and commitment to
the research).
In conjunction with this summary of
the project findings, the investigator communicated
his willingness to meet with and discuss the programmatic implications of the research. No response
to this offer was ever made by either the practitioners, supervisors or administrators of the parole
division or by the members of the Parole Board.
Almost totally ignored, the project became, for the
purpose of the state, a "non-study -- left to
gather dust on a shelf".
There is a considerable danger in generalizing on a subject as extensive as social change. However, two of the major
reasons why program information, such as generated in the three
cases referred to above, is not more extensively utilized in
policy making can be outlined.
TWO REASONS WHY LINKING PROGRAM INFORMATION TO DECISION-MAKING
FAILS TO YIELD PROGRAM CHANGE
The first reason why program information often fails to
lead to change is the perceived INACCURACY of the information.
Evaluation of social programs is often beyond the capabilities of existing methodology. The number of studies that
measure up to minimum standards of scientif4c adequacy is
The following
generally accepted to be exceedingly small.
nine factors account for much of the perceived inaccuracy of
the information generated by evaluation research and demonstration projects in social organizations.
Nine factors that affect the accuracy of the information generated
by evaluation research and demonstration projects are:
1.

The difficulty of measuring
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the effectiveness of

the programs.

For example:

(a) what constitutes the appropriate criteria
of outcome.
(b) output definition and measurement problems,
especially where programs are multi-purpose.
(c) some outputs are easier to measure than
others.
(d) problems of attributing the effect of the
process on the outcome.
In other words, the
research design, selection and administration
affect the outcome. An important question is
how extensive is this effect?
(e) difficulties in directly observing states of
"well being". For example:
Is a person who
is mobile with considerable pain healthier
than someone who is bedridden? etc.

2.

The need to include client opinion, as well as professional judgement, in considering treatment outcome. This creates many methodological problems
including:
(a) how should the client's judgement be weighed
in the evaluation of services?
For example,
the client may express gratitude or frustration for service rendered, rather than an
actual change in condition.
(b) some researchers have noted that treatment
outcome is closely related to client motivation. Given our understanding that equality
of opportunity cannot be equated with the
equality of condition, we can predict that
different clients may perceive identical treatment in entirely different terms.

3.

The inability to check the validity of the research.
Is the project evaluating what it claims to evaluate?
Problems here include:
-213-

(a) outside criteria as an external source to
compare the measuring instrument are usually
not available.
(b) There is often a lack of uniformity in recording case records between agencies.
4.

The difficulty of obtaining a scientifically valid
sample of clients. For example, even the "mix" of
the population to be served, e.g., self-referral,
private agency referral or government agency referral, may affect the results.

5.

The lack of a clearly conceptualized treatment method
in many research programs. For instance, what treatment variables should be included. e.g., Length
of involvement, sex, insights, etc.

6.

The difficulty of fitting research into the normal
routines of the agency and the resultant bias on
outcomes.

7.

The complexity of both the internal organizational
structure and the many levels of interaction with the
external environment.

8.

The inability to replicate most evaluative studies
because of continued changes in both the internal and
external environments.

9.

The difficulty in assessing how the values and attitudes of the professionals affect the service outcome.
Evaluation rests upon a set of values but technical
procedures of evaluation rarely challenge these values.
(Fried, 1968:43)

A second reason why linking program information to policy
fails to yield program change is that the information is often
perceived as a THREAT.
This perception of program information as a threat is shared
-214-

by both the professional workers and administrators.
For
example, if a counselling program is found to be relatively
ineffective it may appear to imply the workers are not performing properly. It may also appear to question the validity
of the professional approach, and, it may even appear to
threaten the very raison d'etre of the organization. Dedication
to organization survival and maintenance often leads to a
"success cult".
(Carter, 1973:17) When the success of programs
are thought to rely on results of evaluation to "pass", the
threat of not passing often leads to obscuring evaluative
results.
Another threat can develop from the potential for drawing
unwarranted conclusions from those who "don't understand" the
limitations as outlined above, on the accuracy of program information.
The lack of credibility of the information generated by
evaluation research and demonstration projects, plus the perceived threat of program information, have both contributed to
the failure of this information to affect program changes. The
author has elsewhere (Cohen, 1974) discussed other characteristics
and imperatives that affect change in social organizations.
While acknowledging the broad complexity of the subject of change
in social organizations ,5 it is proposed that a pre-planning functional information base can assist in overcoming the failure
to link information on program effectiveness to program change.
THE FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION BASE
The creation of a more receptive environment for program
information to affect policy changes is a primary goal of a
functional information base. A key question to ask in most
organizations at the present time is "How can you plan when you
do not know what you are planning for"?
Detailed budget records,
statistics on staff employed and number of clients serviced,
provide the basis for most of an organization's present knowledge
of its operations. A serious shortcoming with this traditional
approach to classifying organizational data by "objects" of
income and expenditures is that it does not directly identify
how all input resources including rent, administration, travel
costs, etc. are distributed to the various service programs which
in total constitute what the organization does. A number of
recent studies have found large discrepancies between what the
staff and the board of an organization think or say they are
-215-

doing, and what they are actually doing in terms of a total
deployment of resources to all actual service programs and
functions.
The information base envisaged here considers that all
data is only data unless it can be used for decision making,
and only then does it become information. The types of decisions
to be made must be anticipated. In social welfare organizations
for instance, this usually implies the need for common caseload
reporting with data related to categories of people. (e.g.,
emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, one parent
families, etc.) These categories of people have needs. Measuring
the extent of organizational success in meeting the needs of these
categories of people provides output information for making
decisions on any changes to be made in existing programs. The
decisions relate to resource allocation to services to meet the
needs of the people.
To provide an appropriate information base for decision
making a functional information base is considered a pre-planning
necessity. Following the implementation of this functional
accounting system 6 an organization should move towards the processes of P.P.B.S. (Planning, programming, budgeting system.)
(See Goodman (1969) for a discussion on the dangers in making
functional budgeting an end unto itself.) The spirit of P.P.B.S.
is a marriage between program planning and budgeting. However,
the program information utilized in P.P.B.S. must be mature if
the marriage is to last. This maturing comes through the processes of acceptance that the functional information base is
reasonably accurate. A major deficiency in many information
systems such as P.P.B.S. is they ignore the need for a sequential
maturing stage before attempting to link program information to
the decision-making processes of organizational change.
ADVANTAGES OF A FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION BASE
There are a number of reasons for assuming that the information base described above will create a more receptive
environment for organizational change than existing evaluation
research and demonstration project techniques.
A functional information data base reflects with reasonable accuracy what resources are actually providing the various
programs the organization is undertaking. This data collection
on existing programs is not a one shot project but an ongoing
process that allows ample opportunity for correctional feed-216-

back from all levels of the organization.
This paper has discussed implications of perceived inaccuracy of information as an important variable inhibiting
organizational change. The involvement of all levels of the
organization in determining how resources are allocated to the
various organizational programs should result in an acceptance
that this functional information base is at least a reasonable
representation of what resources are allocated to what programs.
All three cases referred to earlier in this paper lacked this
commitment to basic program information.
Beside an increased consensus on the accuracy of organizational program information, another advantage of the functional
information base is that the provision of information by programs and services encourages all levels of the organization to
focus on ends rather than means. For example, travel expenditures are not categorized separately, but are grouped to
programs by considering travel for what ... to do ... for what
services? This need to collect unit cost information by at
least crude benefits to the people served logically leads to
questions regarding effectiveness in meeting the needs of the
people being served. For example a counselling service with
costs over 200 per unit of service will probably lead to questions about possible less costly alternatives ... without a
forced review through a formal evaluation with its many limitations already referred to.

A further advantage of a functional information base is a
reduction in the perceived threat to the workers and administrators.
Criticisms can be countered with information that
reasonably reflects what services are being provided and what it
costs to provide them. It is also possible to relate these
costs to at least crude output indicators that reflect the impact
these services appear to have on the client population.
Obviously the information generated by this functional
information base will not always reflect what everyone in the
organization would expect or readily accept. This data is
called a pre-planning information base because it is specifically emphasized that policy making should follow the data
collection. It is true that the information engineering is
always possible. However, by strictly limiting this information
base to what programs are actually being undertaken and how all
organizational resources are utilized to provide these programs,
the political reality of change is placed in sequential order.
-217-

In other words difficult political decisions can be reviewed from
the perspective of a more accurate organizational information base
that is accepted by those responsible for the provision of the
services.
EXAMPLES OF FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION
The scope of this paper does not permit detailed examination of the processes of the program information generation and
its subsequent linkage to organizational change. However, a few
specific examples should illustrate the potential effect on program change.
Table i is the actual functional budget of a small family
agency in a fairly typical North American community of approximately 300,000. The left hand column lists the proportion of
total resources including administration required to provide
these services, while the final three columns show actual and proposed dollars. In this case the funders of the organization were
under the impression their dollars were providing family and
individual counselling. When the newly generated functional
accounting results of Table 1 indicated only little over 50% of
the agencies' resources were being devoted to this service, the
major funders threatened to withdraw part of the next year's
funding. This led to significant changes in the organization.
Tables 2 and 3 provide information on the major functions of
a Y.W.C.A. in a North American community along with functional
accounting information on dollar income, expenses and deficits.
The fact that 42.6% of the projected deficit resulted from the
Health and Physical Education program and in particular from the
operation of the swimming pool, led to considerable discussion of
possible changes in this program area. The functional information
on the proportion of resources devoted to the various program
areas, and the projected deficit attributable to these various programs have already led to organizational change.
Functional information on two adoption agencies operating in
the same city revealed that the rate per adoption between the two
agencies was as follows:
Agency A - Rate per adoption - $338.00
Agency B - Rate per adoption $1,368.00
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TABLE 2
FUNCTIONS UNDERTAKEN By A YWCA. BRANCH WITH PROPORTION
OF TOTAL RESOURCES ALLOCATED To EACH FUNCTION
Proportion of Total
Resources used for
function

Function
1.
2.

Hostel and Transient Program
(The provision of shelter)

39.9%

Health and Physical Fitness (Pool
and Gym)

30.2%

Personal and Social Development
(Courses other than vocational)

9.4%

4.

Vocational Training (typing courses)

6.0%

5.

Big Sisters (Volunteer parental
substitutes)

2.6%

Head Start (Including a nursery
service for paying customers)

7.6%

Other (including the restaurant
service and a number of others)

4.3%

3.

6.
7.
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This huge discrepancy in costs had existed for many years
but major funders were not aware of it. In fact Agency A was
considered by many, to be an "inefficient operation". Substantial differences in the philosophical approach to adoption
between the two agencies exist, with the more expensive service
utilizing a foster care program prior to adoption. However, it
was only after this functional information was available that
serious consideration was given to determining the possible
advantages of one approach over the other. This type of questioning, arising out of actual differences in programs purporting
to accomplish the same goals, has considerable potential for
productive evaluation research.
Vancouver Canada has a uniform functional information system
operating across many non governmental social service agencies.
(Vancouver, 1973) Twenty-four agencies reported they were providing a service defined as "Family and Individual Counselling"
at a unit cost ranging from $3.11 to $29.11. The Girl Guides of
Vancouver had a unit cost of $1.41 for a service defined as
"Group Work", while the Y.W.C.A. unit costs for the same "Group
Work" service category were approximately $17.00. Obviously these
two agencies were not "doing" the same thing in their provision of
"group work".
The relevant point in both these Vancouver examples is that
simply knowing the wide cost variances within supposedly similar
services, permits the asking of questions about effectiveness of
these services that would not be possible without this unit cost
functional information.
SUMMARY
This paper is not proposing that the provision of a functional information base will eliminate the problems related to
change in social organizations. What is suggested is that
existing information in most social organizations is not adequate
to cope with the consequences of evaluation research and demonstration projects. The result is that many important implications
for social change are ignored. The creation of a more receptive
environment for organization change will not just happen. A
functional information base for social organizations is one way
to increase the potential for more effective change in meeting the
needs of people.
-222-

FOOTNOTES
1.

Social organizations for the purposes of this paper refer
to the broad range of organizations providing services
rather than producing products as their primary function.
Health, education and welfare organizations are obvious
examples of social organizations.

2.

See appendix for a brief discussion on the definitions of
evaluation studies and demonstration projects.

3.

For instance, London, Ontario spent over $50,000 on a
multi-problem family project in the 1960's. This demonstration project attempted to replicate many of the St.
Paul concepts and operations. After three years and the
publishing of an extensive report the entire London project
was terminated with no long term effects on program change.

4.

Geismar (1973:14) has noted that "research relating service
characteristics to treatment results are extremely rare".

5.

This information base should not be equated with the total
needs for information in an organization. For instance it
initially does not emphasize objectives, program evaluation
and many areas of internal and external communication.
This information base is concerned with detailing where all
input into the organization is deployed in terms of what
the organization is doing (its programs) and accounted for
in units that allow for eventual evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs.

6.

See Cohen (1974) and Frank (1973) for relevant discussions
on P.P.B.S.

-223-

Evaluation studies and demonstration projects have been
defined and redefined, organized and reorganized in so many ways
that it is impractical to overview the subject in this paper.
For example, Carter and Wharf (1973) list fifteen pages of
bibliography related to evaluating social development programs.
This list of eighty books and one hundred fourteen articles,
periodicals and papers is far from a comprehensive list related
to this subject alone.
Within the context of this paper "a demonstration project
is defined as a field experiment designed to test the value and
feasibility as well as the practical implications of
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

a new program or new social structure
an inventive approach to providing services or
dealing with new and unresolved social problems
adopting an operational program to a new setting
modifying existing programs to make them more
responsive to current social problems and needs
with the objective of improving the character and/or
quality of the social environment and of services
(Canada,
rendered by the organizations involved".
Demonstration Projects, 1970.)

For the purposes of this paper evaluation studies, evaluation
research and similar designations assume the Webster's dictionary
"determine the worth of; appraise".
definition of evaulate:
Although the implications of the extent of scientific
sophistication in evaluations is referred to in this paper, a
more detailed analysis is not practical here. For instance, some
attempts have been made to differentiate evaluation studies from
evaluative research. Evaluation studies often refer to the broad
spectrum of attempts to determine how effective programs are in
meeting their objectives. Even informal interviews and observations are included in this classification. On the other hand,
evaluative research is often limited to a more rigid scientifically
disciplined approach. This more rigid evaluation would usually
include criteria such as Coplans" (1968) three fold classification
of process evaluation, achievement evaluation and administrative

-224-

evaluation, using scientifically accepted procedures to measure
effectiveness. There is, however, little consensus on these
definitional differentiations.
Within the context of this paper it is considered appropriate to include a wide spectrum of definitions by assuming
the broad generic dictionary definition of evaluation.
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1.

THE PROBLEM

Although progress has been uneven and the parameters for establishing interdisciplinary approaches remain to be settled, new ways of using the behavioral
sciences in the field of law are beginning to be explored more systematically.1
At this point, the relevance of behavioral science materials in legislation,
litigation, administrative and evaluative activities of government does suggest
some of the most promising areas for further exploration and development.
Social science knowledge can be used, of course, to influence legislation in
It can serve, for example, to shed light on some aspects of behavior
various ways.
which are of concern and which may be potentially subject to legislation. Hence,
knowledge regarding the nature of deviance such as delinquency, criminality, mental
illness or of the nature of the normal childhood, adolescent, maturing and aging
processes can form the basis upon which sound social policies are advanced and
desirable legislation enacted. Behavioral science may also be useful in the more
direct examination of some of the legal institutions and social control systems
to determine how they work and to assess outcomes. For example, studies of the
criminal justice system, that is, the relative functioning of the police, courts,
juries and correctional personnel can offer new insights into how agencies of
social control operate and point up the need for legislative reforms.
A variety of research tools and techniques may be applied to provide the
"hard" data to influence legislation. Ideally, where the problem may be clearly
defined and the significant variables controlled through careful experimentation
so that findings can be shown to be "Conclusive", the arguments for influencing
legislation would appear to be compelling. But what happens in the more usual
case where this ideal is not met?
This paper will discuss some of the issues and problems which arise in the
field of delinquency prevention where there is over-riding public interest and concern
and calls for action to prevent delinquency, but where the problem is elusive and
where the variables are not easily isolated and controlled through experimental
procedures. What, in fact, constitutes the body of knowledge in the field? What
uses can be made of behavioral science materials where there has been little or no
experimental successes, or data upon which to build action programs? What credence
should be given to the largely unverified "practice" knowledge and experience in
delinquency prevention programs? These questions will be explored here in an effort
to provide a more responsible frame of reference for suggesting and assessing legislation in the field of delinquency prevention.
Basically, it will be shown thai although there have been many theoretical
breakthroughs, numerous studies and even more action programs, our knowledge as to
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how to go about preventing delinquency is surprisingly limited. Although it hardly
increases confidence is one's ability to influence legislation, it does not follow
that there is no role of the behavioral sciences in the matter. To be sure, it may
can provide a basis for influe
be argued, for example, that lack of knowledge itself
legislative action which would substantially increase our knowledge of program efOr, at the very least, what is already known may provide a rationale
fectiveness.
for rejection poorly formulated schemes which claim to be able to "eliminate"
delinquency.
Our discussion will focus briefly on the nature of prevention and the ways in
which different perspectives come to influence definitions of the problem and limit
Notwithstanding the importance and need for
the scope of the proposed solutions.
adequate theory, major attention will be given over to a review of delinquency prevention programs in an effort to highlight the variety of program goals, limited usq
And finally, some of the problems
of research methods and paucity of the findings.
and issues regarding the ways in which programs selectively define, label and treat
individuals in the name of prevention will be explored to provide some guidance in
further assessing how social science knowledge may be useful in legislation.
II.

VARYING PERSPECTIVES OF DEVIANCE AND THE CONCEPT OF PREVENTION

The development of effective conceptual tools has been a slow and tedious
process in the behavioral sciences. Some doubt whether it will ever be possible to
invent the adequate means to portray social reality in its totality. This sould not
surprise us, however, for it is true that we never see things in their total conWe see only certain aspects - those that we have been taught to abstract.
creteness.
using the currency of our own cultural symbols. As Walter Lippman expressed in his
famous aphorism, "First we look, then we name and only then do we see." A group of
young people hanging on the corner, obstructing pedestrians, cluttering entrances
to buildings, brings about different reactions depending upon whether they are defined as demonostrators, strikers, Christmans carolers or members of the loach
It is therefore, in the naming and defining of behavior that we
"Black-Hawk" gang.
significance.
come to "see" its
What passes for knowledge and understanding, then, must center on how we
In exploring the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim
arrive at these definitions.
introduced the notion of relationism which states that truth is not necessarily a
fixed commodity but is predicated on the historial and situational context in which
As cross-sultural studies have repeatedly demonstrated, our own
it is found.
involvement and narrowed cultural frame-of-reference in a sense, institutionalizes
"Culture hides much more than it
As Hall put it,
our own versions of the truth.
reveals, and strangely enough what it hides, it hides most effectively from its ow
'2
In short, what we see or overlook depends on the concepts available
participants."
to us.
So it is with the helping professions where even the most carefuly description
of delinquency are not automatically objective for all behavioral definitions have
pre-established connotations. There is a ready set of concepts when it comes to
as a prophecy
we have an image of the delinquent which serves
Thus,
delinquency.
as selected aspects are highlighted, blotting
we are altogether too eager to fulfill
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out others not conveniently covered by the label. The pre-fabricated conceptual
molds come in all sizes and shapes. One set forces us to recognize antiestablishmentism, the generation gap, contradicting sub-cultural values, etc. A
psychoanalytic set calls attention to dependency, ambivalence, psychosexual
conflicts
resurging oedipal conflicts. And still another perspective sets us
searching for anomia in the social system, status deprivations and role confusions
in social and interpersonal relationships.
Similarly, concepts of prevention 3 vary considerably depending on the set
of concepts one employs. Hence, there are major differences of opinion regarding
what is to be prevented, who is to be deterred, and what constitutes successful
intervention. There are, first of all, those who see solutions in terms of broad
attempts to change and upgrade life styles. Those who are particularly impressed
with social and cultural determinants of behavior tend to emphasize programs aimed
at treating the entire social milieu in which all children grow up. The theory
is that the best way to prevent delinquency is by enhancing healthy growth and
development. Thus, the focus of attention is on improving community and family
life.
As housing, employment, recreation, social and cultural conditions improve,
delinquency will accordingly be prevented.
The second approach is less global in that the focus of attention is limited
to those children who are deemed to be "at risk" or have given some reason to believe
that they will become delinquent unless something is done to prevent it from
happening.
Advocates of this approach emphasize early detection and direct
"treatment" of those children who are identified as vulnerable, disturbed,
troubled, or potential delinquents.
The third approach is the most constructive insofar as the notion of prevention is more precise and limited insofar as it applies solely to known or
adjudicated delinquents. In this sense, programs which are designed to correct
or rehabilitate delinquent youngsters prevent delinquency by reducing recidivism
and lessening the likelihood that further delinquent acts would be committed.
These three perspectives form a convenient framework for review of delinquency
prevention programs.
III REVIEW OF DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROGRAMS. RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS.
A. Imoroving Community Life Styles
Perhaps one of the better known approaches to delinquency prevention which
sought to reach the delinquent in his natural social environment was the Chicago
Area Project initiated by Clifford Shaw and his associates in 1934.4 The program
was based on the premise that delinquency, in most cases, was a process of social
learning, experienced by youth growing up in delinquency areas. The social milieu
in which delinquent boys were nurtured - the family, play group and neighborhood all had to be considered in any preventative measures to reduce delinquent behavior.
Accordingly, the key to prevention was seen to depend on broad level change
in the character of the neighborhood life whereby the community would become more
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"wholesome" for children. Moreover, there was the conviction that change could
best be implemented by the self-help efforts of neighborhood residents, themselve,
By working together on commonly defined neighborhood problems it was reasoned tha
increased sense of neighborhood feeling and responsibility would develop. Naturi
leaders from the neighborhood were recruited to prove recreational and educationa
activities and to provide healthy role models for growing boys. The idea was
"to give the pre-delinquent or delinquent boy an opportunity to form an attachmenil
to, or come under the influence of, a person or persons from who he would receive
recognition for conforming to conventional standards of conduct." 5
Unfortunately, the project was not subjected to strict experimentation and
whatever results were measured were inconclusive. It was demonstrated that residents in low income areas could, indeed, organize themselves, sustain community
organizations and attract local "natural" leadership which would have some impact
on community life. But there were no precise measurements or "hard" evidence to
show that there6 was any actual reduction in delinquency which could be attributec
to the program.
A series of other community-based programs were conducted which were simile
The Midcity Project was initiated in
in conception to the Chicago Area Project.
a lower social economic area in Boston in 1954.7 This was a multi-facted progr
One of the majc
focused on improving community conditions to reduce delinquency.
goals in the program included efforts to coordinate the work of existing social
agencies to help "problem" families and to reach out to delinquent youths. Over
a three year period, seven project field workers maintained contact with approxiIt was determined, on
mately four hundred youths between the ages of 12 and 21.
law
evaluation, that there was "no significant measureable inhibition to either
8
violation or unethical behavior as a consequence of the project efforts."
9
established in 1955 by the
Similarly, the South Central Youth Project,
social agencies to
coordinate
sought
to
Council
Welfare
Minneapolis Community
detect and reverse the processes leading to delinquency by improving community
and neighborhood life. Again, no adequate measures of program outcome were
available although one finding was that the lack of cooperation and communication
between agencies and community residents resulted in "ineffective services",
generally.

More recently, the Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development of
the Depa ment of Health, Education and Welfare funded a number of community base
aimed at delinquency prevention all of which may be viewed as modernprograms
11
for
The Mobilization for Youth,
day counterparts of the Chicago Area Project.
example, sought to organize neighborhood groups to engage in self-help social
action to overcome apathy and defeatism evidenced in a sixty-seven block area in
a lower socio-economic area of New York City. It was conceived that as poor
people organized and developed as a power base, though would be able to deal more
effectively with poor housing, poor schools, inadequate police protection, etc.
In the process, deprived youth would be offered new opportunities to develop moti
It was held that with increased compete
vation and skills to advance themselves.
would come increased social controls and less delinquency. The focus on develOPi
a political power resulted, however, in increased conflicts and resistance from
other governmental agencies.
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Similarly, the Syracuse Crusade for Opportunity 1 2 sought to mobilize
community groups to engage in social action to counteract the conditions of
poverty, transience and chronic dependency on the theory that delinquency would,
in turn, be prevented. It was found that contrary to the experience of the
Chicago Area Project, friction between professional staffs and neighborhood
residents over decision-making powers was most apparent. No evidence was found
1o show how delinquency was reduced although some activities provided the youth
appeared to have a positive impact. The United Planning Organization 1 3 in
Washington, D.C. represented another effort to mobilize citizen action and
involvement in creating new opportunities for youth. Unique it relied on
decentralized decision-making activities where a variety of relatively independent
block clubs and social bettermeht programs were organized. But, gaps, in communication and coordination of effort was held to be a major shortcoming of the
project.
Although the Houston Action for Youth 14 was also designed to mobilize
community groups, its program which included stable, working population utilized
.ow-pressure tactics in approaching area problems on the theory that confrontation
vith other governmental agencies would be counterproductive. Varying degrees of
buccess were recorded but no clear evidence regarding delinquency prevention could
e produced. 1 nother low pressured approach was used in the Action for Appalachian
outh

Program

2

in Charleston, West Virginia where much of the effort was on the

Improvement of a rural target area through the use of neighborhood organization
essociations. In a sense, the program sought to reduce the stresses and strains
between rural and urban life styles which were seen to be instrumental in creating
Aelinquent behavior. Although some problem solving occurred, the net impact on
the isolated communities seemed to be relatively small.
And finally, the Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited Associated (HARYOU
ACT)16
was initiated in Harlen, New York to reach a target population of a
guarter of a million people. Based on the now familiar goal of creating opportunities for youth, the program sought to introduce broad based community
phange through citizen participation and action. But again, the massive urban
problems were not soluable and the results of the dffort were judged to be
negligible.
In most of these recent programs many of the potential benefits were somewhat
pbscured by the fact that controversy and conflicts emerged where competing interest
groups and political powers often redirected efforts into diffuse channels. In
addition, a number of-theprograms were found to be administered in a weak and
ineffective manner. And, the broad scope and multi-faceted nature of such programs
made it unlikely that any conclusive evidence could be gathered to show direct
.ause and effect relationships between the intervention and delinquency reduction.
!1he lack of any controlled comparisons makes it difficult to verify claims of
success.
A number of studies have been aimed at evaluating community recreation and
informal education programs. In the field of recreation, there are many different
kinds of organizations and programs embodying varying philosophies, objectives
and programs. Given the broad scope of its activities, it would appear that
virtually every effort to reach out and channel or direct the energies of youth
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could in one way or another be considered to be a program of prevention. To be
sure, the public has come to accept and recognize recreation as a major tool in
delinquency prevention. Yet although many surveys have been conducted to determine
the need for recreation and to assess the quantity and quality of the programs being
offered, few evaluative studies have been conducted to demonostrate how positive
recreational experiences lead to a reduction of delinquency.
Moreover, the few studies that were conducted seemed to indicate that there
was no direct relationship between the two. In fact, one study even suggested
that perhaps recreational activities may increase opportunities for delinquent
escapades.
Ethel Shanas and Catherine Dunning's1 7 early study, conducted in the 1930's
for the Chicago Recreation Commission, concluded that not much could be expected
from the traditional recreation programs in prevention of delinquency. The study
compared delinquents and non-delinquents' use of recreational facilities in four
slum areas and one middle class area in Chicago. Among the approximately 15,000
boys and 8,000 girls, 10 to 17 years old, involved in the study, it was found that
although a larger number of non-delinquents used the recreational facilities,
delinquent boys tended to spend more time in the recreation activities but less
time in'supervised'programs. Generally, however, recreation tended to attract
relatively few children especially among the older groups where delinquency rates
were found to be the greatest.
Another study was conducted during the same period by Andrew Truxall 8 for
the National Recreation Commission. He tabulated juvenile court cases by
health department census tracts and compared them with the existence of recreation centers. In spite of certain methodological problems, it could not be
shown that there was lower delinquency rates in areas where there were recreation
facilities compared to those without such facilities.
Frederick Thrasher 1 9 conducted an early study of one voluntary "leisuretime" agency - a Boys Club in the City of New York - in an effort to discover its
effectiveness in the prevention of juvenile delinquency. In contrast to the
Shanas and Dunning findings, the Boys Club was able to attract larger proportions
of delinquents and "apt-to-be-delinquents" into its recreation programs. It was
found, however, that of the total official offenses of Boys Club members, 18
percent occurred before joining the Club, 28 percent took place after some
participation in the Club program, and 61 percent occurred while the boys were
actively affiliated with the program. Some of this could be explained in terms
of the larger proportion of older boys (where delinquency is more prevalent) who
were in the program. Based on case studies of 60 "problem" boys, Thrasher
concluded that "acute behavior problems.. .percipitated the various combinations
of family disorganization, dire poverty, school maladjustments, gang activities,
association with older hoodlums and underworld characters - were beyond the
20 '
power of the Boys Club to neutralize. "
In another study of the effectiveness of the Boys Club on the prevention
of delinquency, Brown and Dodson 21 compared delinquency rates of white boys in
three areas of Louisville, Kentucky. They reported reduced rates of delinquency
which there was a Boys Club while delinquency rates increased in the areas
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without Club programs. In the absence of experimental controls, however, there
was no way to assess the influences of other social variables on the changing
The authors had to conclude that although it might be comforting to
rates.
know that the Boys Club "contributes to the alleviation of the delinquency
to basic knowledge on the prevention of
problem" the findings add "little
delinquency."22
B.

Redirecting Potential Delincquents

Various innovative 1rograms have emerged in an effort to reach out and
work with potential delinquents before their difficulties become too serious.
23
was established in 1935 with the
The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study
dual purpose of preventing delinquency and providing scientific research data
on delinquency prevention. The study ranks as on of the better studies which
utilized a built-in experimental design. The major objective was to determine
whether on-going relationships with friendly adult counselors would prevent
vulnerable children from becoming delinquent.

Teachers, social workers and juvenile justice personnel referred hundreds
of boys under the age of twelve who appeared to be heading for delinquent
careers. The project staff arrived at a population of 325 matched pared based
on data supplied from questionnaires,psychological and medical tests and interviews
with parents, teachers and the boys, themselves. One half of the boys were randomly
assigned to receive ongoing counseling while the other half constituted a control
of group for comparison purposes. Threatment lasted over a seven year period.
While the program was in progress, psychological tests were given, checks were
These failed to
made on school adjustment and court records were examined.
disclose any significant differences between the treatment and control groups.
24
conducted an in-depth study of the program
Edwin Powers and Welen Witmer
almost three years after the program ended. They found that according to juvenile
court and criminal records, the control group had comitted as many and as serious
2
offenses as had the experimental group. Again, in 1956, Joan and William McCord 5
conducted another follow-up study, this time tracing 253 of the matched boys into
adulthood. Their many comparisons led them to conclude that treatment variations
and subsequent convictions provided no evidence that the treatment had successfully
6
The data did, however, suggest that "intensive" treatment
deterred criminalityo2
might have been more beneficial than the more general "Friendly guidance" approach.
Although judged to be a failure, the program has been acclaimed as a model in
experimental design which when applied consistently would provide a sound basis
for assessing program effectiveness.

Another careful experimental research design was employed by Meyer, Borgatta
27
in their study of four entering cohorts of girls in a vocational high
and Jones
school in New York City. The major goal was to determine the effectiveness of
social work intervention in preventing "problem" behavior. Records containing
data on school behavior, personal characteristics and family situations were used
to screen potential problems cases. A random procedure was used to refer 189 of
the cases to a social work agency for on-going casework services to be compared
with 192 non-treated control cases. A wide range of data regarding in-school and
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out-of-echool behavior was collected over a four year period (1955-59).
Comparisons of the treatment and control group revealed that the impact of the
service on the girls had been negligible. Few statistically significant
differences were found leading the researchers to conclude that the "limited
demonstration of effectiveness raises important questions of appropriate goals
of service pggrams as well as issues about social work practices and its
evaluation."
Another effort to study the effectiveness of a program designed to prevent
29
potentially problematic behavior was conducted by Ahlstrom and Havighurst.
All seventh grade boys in inner city schools in Kansas City were screened to
arrive at a target group of 13 and 14 year old "socially and educationally
maladjusted" boys who look like "loosers." One half were randomly assigned
to receive special attention through participation in a half-day program. The
control boys participated in the regular school program. Data were collected on
school, work, community and family adjustment on all the boys through the age
of eighteen and nineteen. The independent variable, "work experience" included
data on three different developmental stages in required work skills, supervision,
etc. It was found that only about one fourth of the boys "seemed to profit"
from the work/study experience. The authors concluded that their findings failed
to Amonstrate that supervised work e ' eriences could materially reduce
delinquency "among youth so disposed. 18
Reckless and Dinitz 3 1 report on another research demonstration project
aimed at preventing anticipated delinquent behavior. Teachers and principals
of 44 elementary schools in the inner city of Columbus, Ohio provided ratings
of boys who were randomly assigned to receive specialized instruction with a
strong emphasis on "role model" building; a control group of vulnerables who
were randomly assigned to receive regular classroom instruction; and a group
of non - vuln erable (good-boys) who served as another control group. The boys
were compared on the basis of psychological tests, value orientations, attitudes,
conduct records, school performance and encounters with the police.
It was found that there was no statistically significant differences between
the experimental and the control group of vulnerable boys. No differences were
found in the number of police contacts, in the seriousness of offenses or in any
of the school attendance, drop-out, and achievement indicators. Police contacts
tended to increase with age where it was found that by the end of the tenth grade
almost one-half of the nominated "bad" boys in both experimental and control
groups were known to police School performance also deteriorated with age. The
comparison "good-boys" on the other hand remained somewhat insulated over this
time period. In spite of these results, it was suggested that perhaps the
role model lesson provided the experimental group was not sufficiently intense
3
to insure the desired "internalization." 2
A number of other programs have been conducted without using such experimental
designs where measures of success have not been as carefully measured and control
Yet, experiences gained in many of the programs are widely publicized after acting
as a stimulus for initiating other similar programs.
The Passaic Children's Bureau 3 3 was established in 1937 to consolidate the
facilities of the public school and police department to reach out to all cases
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involving "bothersome behavior" who had been subject to complaints by police,
teachers, social workers, and others concerned with youths. The bureau staff
was composed of a director from the school's guidance department, counselors,
attendance officers, social workers, psychologists and police officers. Based
on statutory powers giving broad attendance officers in the school broad investigatory and disposition powers, a variety of incorrigibles and truants
were prov ded psychological, psychiatric and other forms of social treatment.
4
in a limited study of police arrests of Bureau clients, found only
Kvaraceus
fifteen percent of the boys and who had reached the age of sixteen to have been
arrested at least once. Although the percentage appears small, it reveals very
little concerning the effectiveness of the program. Similarily, other data
showing declines in juvenile court cases and reductions in juveniles committed
to institutions cannot be held to be conclusive insofar as there were no adequate
research controls on intervening variables.
3
The St. Paul Experiment in Child Welfare 5 was set up in 1937 by the
United States Childrens Bureau to study the problem of identifying and treating
children with personality and behavior problems, and to study ways of integrating
children into the community at large. A team consisting of a psychiatrist,
psychologist and social worker was organized to locate children with incipient
behavior and personality difficulties in a high delinquency area. Based on
contacts with schools, police and social agencies, children were recruited into
the program and provided services which included intensive psychiatric help,
social casework and group work and community organization and a variety of
referrals to foster care, health care, etc.

After six years of operation, it was determined that 739 children had
received group services; 727 individual services not including an unstated number
of referrals. Effectiveness was judged by staff members on termination of the
project. It was found that "major improvements" were seen in 18 percent of the
children. Sixty five percent made what was judged to be "partial improvement"
and seventeen percent made "no improvement.,"36
37
The New York City Youth Board , established in 1947, was hailed as one
of the first comprehensive state-wide delinquency prevention programs undertaken.
Basically, the program sought first to identify children who had behavior and
personality problems to make appropriate referrals for needed services and second,
to expand treatment facilities to more effectively meet the needs of these youths.
The program was confined to the areas in the City of New York with the highest
delinquency rates. Through an intricate system of coordinating referrals, through
the City Department of Welfare and Education, and "contracting" with as many as
twenty different voluntary family, youth and special treatment agencies, new
services were generated to reach out to potential delinquents. Although this
program represented a bold venture into new practice areas, research was limited.
In assessing results, however, it was acknowledged that there were great variations
in outcomes depending upon the "family's capacity for change" and the "skill of
38
the worker" involved.

A number of the prevention projects have centered around the public school
as the more suitable focal point for working with potential delinquents.
39
and the Montefiore
The "600" and "700" special schools in New York City
40
serve as examples of specialized schools aimed
and Mosely Schools in Chicago
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at "normalizing" problem students through individualized instruction, scaling
down expectations and lessening competitive situations. Results have not been
conclusive although reports indicate that there has been some lessening of
truancy and teacher-student conflicts. Still to be tested are a variety of
41
different school related programs such as the all-day neighborhood school,
community school and other special work/study programs.
42
was begun in a junior high
A school program known at Higher Horizons
school in Manhattan in 1956 which has since been expanded to over 76 public
schools. The focus of the program was on "disadvantaged children" who were
provided specialized counseling and guidance, special instruction and remedial
services to broaden cultural experiences. There has been evidence of improved
scholastic achievement although there was little to show how delinquent behavior
was deterred by the services.
43
which used a more rigorous
Glen Wallace described a research program
design in the experimentation of intensive planning, coordination of guidance
and counselling services in the Tulsa School System to "alleviate behavior
problems" of children. The study found that there were no statistically
significant differences in the efficacy of interagency coordination regarding
attendance, nature of school offenses and court referrals of children although
there were increased grade point averages achieved by participants in the
program.

The Maximum Benefits Project" in Washington consisted of a special progran
of social casework which includedoa variety of supportive psychological and home
treatment services for children with severe school problems in two elementary
schools. During the years 1954-57 a group of 179 children were referred, evaluai
and treated. These were matched with an untreated control group by age, sex, rac
Follow-up data, based on police and juvenile court records,
and Glueck scores.
were described as being "far from encouraging" as no significant differences
Sixty-nine percent of the
between the treated and untreated groups were found.
104 treated children were determined to be delinquent compared with 63 percent
of the untreated group. The authors concluded4 hat social casework would be of
little value to potentially delinquent youths.
6
The Seattle Atlantic Street Center,4 supported by a U.S. Public Health
Services Research Grant, did a study conducted to test the effectiveness of
social work with "acting out youth" in the school and/or community. Based on
the predicitions of sixth grade teachers, children were provided with social work
services over a two year period. Fifty-four boys who were served in the program
were compared to a control group on school records, and on a "severity scale" to
measure the degree of offenses committed. No significant differences were found
in the frequency or severity of offenses between the two groups.

And, a final approach to preventing delinquency through work within the
school was evidenced in the relatively new concept of the police-school liaison
programs which sought to create better understanding between police and youth.
47
where police officers were assigned to work
The program originated in Michigan
h as a law enforcement officer and resource
bo
act
to
along with specific schools
4
compared a group of students in a school
An evaluation by Wierman
counselor.
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with a liaison officer with a group without an officer. Whereas negative
attitudes towards police were found to increase in the group where there was
no officer, it could not be shown, on the other hand, that there wan an
improvement in attitudes towards police in the experimental school.
49
have also been introduced over the years to reach
A number of programs
out into the community and work directly with youth in their natural groups or
gangs, to prevent anti-social delinquent behavior.

Perhaps the best known gang out-reach worker projects were identified with
the Chicago Area Project and the New York City Youth Board work discussed above.
Based on the theory that gang mcmbers were not likely to be attracted to conventional types of building-centered programs, these projects set out to use
neighborhood street corner contacts to establish relationships, develop trust
and provide direct help to troubled youth in their natural groups. For the
most part, the program relied on the concept that group structures could be
modified, group values changed a% behavior redirected. Unfortunately, there
to support the otherwise positive findings
was little experimental evidence
of work and program planners who were immersed in the day-to-day provision
of services.
Walter Miller, an anthropologist, reports on what he calls "the corner
group method" of preynting gang delinquency which was used in the Boston
The focus of the program was on restructuring gangs
Delinquency Project.
into more or less formally organized clubs to help shift the members from
law-violating behavior to law-abiding behavior. The project was conducted in
three neighborhoods and involved 193 boys ranging in ages from 12 to 18 years
Seven trained group workers worked with
who were members of corner groups.
seven such groups intensively and seven other groups less intensively. Data
were collected from worker recordings and official records including information
regarding court appearances, group law-violating behavior, and changing relationships between group members. The finding showed that there was a definite impact
on patterns of group behavior which resulted in a decrease of law-violating
52
The lack of control
behavior especially during the early phases of the project.
groups, however, make it difficult to assess the program adequately.
Another gang out-reach project which relied heavily on social group
5 3
Groups of teenagers
conducted in Chicago.
work as the Hyde Park Youth Project
who were deemed to be potential delinquents by the Hyde Park Center were
identified. Three street club workers served eleven street clubs during the
three year period in which evaluation took place. Data from police and court
records, community institutions report and worker impressions were combined
into an index to show degrees of anti-social behavior before and after service.
Of a total of 326 youths in the program, reduction in anti-social behavior was
observed in 151 or 40 percent. Ten percent were found to have increased their
delinquent activities. Of 156 youths found not to be involved in anti-social
activities, almost half were so classified from the earliest contacts. It was
increase" and "some decrease" in the frequency
concluded that there was "little
Again, the lack of control group data
of anti-social behavior by the youths.
constitutes a drawback in interpreting the findings.
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in New York City sought to prevent
Henry Street Settlement House
delinquency through early identification and treatment of pre-delinquency
gangs.
The program engaged parents as well as youth in joint problem-solving
activities within the settlement. Experience with five delinquent gangs and
parents seemed to show "positive effects" in behavior although no hard data,
based on experimentally controlled observations, were offered to support
the cnnclusions. Nevertheless, it was reported that the key to checking
pre-delinquency in pre-adolescent groups lies in helping to reinstate parental
influences where it rightfully belongs and in building stronger ties between
children and their parents.
55

In an exploratory study of delinquent subcultures by Irving Sperge1
it was shown how "opportunity structures" within a neighborhood influenced the
kind of delinquent subcultures which prevailed in a neighborhood. However,
although a later detailed presentation concerning the theory and practice of
solid evidence presented to
street gang work was presented, there is little
show how the intervention of a gang worker, in fact, redtced delinquency as
it is nurtured and furthered through gang affiliations.5

C.

Reducing Recidivism and Rehabilitation Delinquents

Typically, the bulk of the delinquency prevention programs aimed at
treating delinquents to prevent further delinquency are found in the juvenile
justice systems as they are found to operate throughout the private mental health
and child guidance clinics.
57
for treating delinquents was set up
The earliest psychiatric clinic
Most of the
in the Chicago Juvenile Court by Dr. William Healy in 1909.
programs soon to follow sought to deal with delinquency as a problem within
Therapy was to consist of clinical services aimed at
the child's personality.
treating behavioral disorders. The efforts of psychiatrists, psychologists,
social workers, teachers and other professionals were coordinated through
staff conferences designed to assess diagnose and formulate treatment plans
based on mental hygiene principles.58

Whereas the early efforts were aimed primarily at coordinating other
treatment resources and environmental manipulation, the later trend was
towards providing more direct psychiatric treatment for delinquents. A
common feature of the program was the emphasis on modifying parent-child
relations.
A number of research evaluation studies were conducted at the Judge Baker
Clinic in Boston which was one of the best known, well-staffed treatment programs
In early years, the program relied heavily on study, diagnosis and served as a
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59
conducted by Sheldon
In a study
resource to make recommendations to the court.
and Eleanor Glueck, based on the records of 1,000 boys who had been referred by
the Juvenile Court to the Judge Baker Clinic, it was found that five years after
being examined and diagnosed, 88 percent of the boys had continued in their nonconforming delinquent behavior. Seventy percent had been convicted of serious
offenses while about one-third of the boys had been arrested four or more times.

The research staff of the clinic compared court records of another group of 1,000
boys who were before the juvenile court at the same time but who were not examined
The comparison showed that both groups had similar rates of
in the clinic.
O
recidivism.
Shifting away from the study-recommendations approach, the focus of prevention
was placed on direct intervention with the delinquents and their parents. Healy
and Broner 6l conducted a study of treatment effectiveness in Boston, Detroit,
One hundred and five delinquent boys were compared to 105 nonand New Haven.
It was found that about
delinquent siblings along with 40 other unmatched pairs.
one-half of the boys treated had not engaged in misconduct during the ten year
period following treatment. While this was significant, there were great differences
inthe nature of the success. For example, almost none of the more seriously
disturbed responded favorably to treatment. Those with pathological social
circumstances seemed to fair better than expected while the greatest successes
were with the more average maladjusted boys. The findings were influenced somestudies were above average compared to the more
what by the fact that the programs
6
typical child guidance clinics. 2
Based on these findings, the Judge Baker Clinic modified their intake policy
inefforts to refine and make treatment more effective. But, subsequent studies
continued to show ineffective results with the more seriously disturbed and with
social problems which were more extreme. However, it was recognized that services
were extended primarily to families were treatment if desired and motivation for
help influences participation. Hence, the programs have been criticized in that
they tend to serve clients who are not representative of the total delinquent
population.
The Highfields project in New Jersey represented a pioneer project in the
use of guided group interaction as a major method for the rehabilitation of
lelinquents. The program consists of residential treatment aimed at a population
of approximately 20 boys, adjudicated delinquents, aged 16 and 17, who were
referred to the juvenile court. The boys remain in residence for from three
to four months. Days are spent in working at a mental institution and evenings
are devoted to the group counselling sessions.
At least two evalu tion studies have been conducted on the Highfields
project. McCorkle et a73 found that in comparison to general parole violation,
statistics show there was a better adjustment of the Highfield boys compared to
other parolees, over a five year period. Only eighteen percent of the Highfield 6 4
boys had violated parole compared to 33 percent of a control groups. Ashley Weeks
compared the Highfields boys with a group of boys who had been sent to a traditional
reformatory delinquents. The experimental control groups were not, however,
randomly determined but were more accurately follow-up studies on placements
determined by the juvenile court judges. It was found that of the total 229 boys

to Highfields, 60 percent, as compared to 47 percent of the reformatory boys,
completed their treatment and did not get into serious trouble so as to be
re-institutionalized. The higher percentage of success found among Negro
Highfield boys in interpreted to counteract criticism that the Highfields
projects tends to be sent "better prospects for success." Because of the
controls of variables, these evaluative studies have
question regarding adequgte
5
been subject to dispute.
66
stimulated by the apparent success
The Provo (pinehills) Experiment
of the Highfields Project in the rehabilitation of delinquents was begun in
Provo, Utah in 1956 by a group of professional and lay volunteers. Funded by the
Ford Foundation, the program sought to treat habitual offenders, 15 to 17 years
old, assigned by the juvenile court. In contrast to the residetial program at
Highfields, in the Provo experiment the boys continued to live in their homes
and were free to participate in community activities throughout their treatment
which lasted from four to seven months. The major form of treatment during the
early stages and community adjustment at later stages.

The Pinehill experiment consisted of a comparison of program participants
in two control groups - one of boys and probation and another of boys committed
Whereas initially the design called for random
to a regular training school.
selection from a common population of repeated offenders, the methods were not
rigidly followed. Findings showed lesser percentages of rearrested within
six months compared to 77 percent of those on probation and 42 percent of those
in the State School. It should be noted, however, that there was relatively
little difference between the Pinehill group and those who were placed on
probation.
Other shor term residential treatment programs aimed at rehabilitation
In the Freemont Experimer
have been conducted by the California Youth Authority.
for example, small group treatment for example, small group treatment and work
experiences were used in conjunction with home visits to try to prevent recidivism
A group of Fremont Boys were compared with a control group of regular institutionIn a two year period follow-up study it was determined that
alized delinquents.
no significant differences were found between those receiving specialized treatIn another similar study, the Fricot Rand
ment and those inc he regular program.
effective was examined by comparing resident delinquents who
training school's
were divided into experimental and control groups, the experimental group being
"more often exposed" to peer group and staff member contacts. Although the experimental group tended to be less troublesome for longer periods of time, it was
found that 80 percent of both treatment and control groups were in trouble some
time during the three year follow-up period studies.
6
The California Youth Athority's 9 controlled experiments in correction offer
other illustrations of the use of research in measuring "community treatment"
effectiveness. Based on careful screening procedures, boys and girls were either
randomly assigned to community treatment or referred for correctional institution
Treatment consisted of group counselling, therapy, family therapy, and
treatment.
school tutoring, etc. A repetition of psychological tests were used as one indicat
by reof successful treatment along with a measure of "failure rates" determined
institutionalism after release. It was reported, on a fifteen month follow-UP
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that only 28 percent of those paroled from the experimental group had been
revoked compared to 52 percent of the control group.
Later extensions of the program into Watts and Oakland - high delinquent
areas - were similarily evaluated but with less rigorous research methodology
inasmuch as random assignments were not made to control groups for comparison
purposes. After fifteen months exposure, 39 percent of the project participants
were subject to parole revocations compared to 48 percent for what the equivalent
state-wide rates for youth of similar ages.
IV SOME POTENTIAL USES OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE TO INFLUENCE LEGISLATION
A look at some of the common themes 7 0 which seem to underlie the delinquency
prevention programs suggests some problems and issues arise in comtemplating
any legislation. In the first place, it is clear that programs vary greatly
in philosoohy, programming goals as well as in operational styles. Even where
some share common preventive orientation, no standardized prescription exist and
nosingle treatment method, however defined, seems to be applied throughout the
programs. The complex social realities of differing environments allow for too
many social variables to enter the picture and there is no way to control these
given the state of our knowledge. In addition, the failure to integrate and
coordinate desperate approaches is significant in that it reflects the tendency
foragencies to function in relative isolation from each other, offering services
based on differing criteria which may or may not contribute to the overall
solutions.
To be sure, there is no reason to recommend that a standard approach be
adopted. On the contrary, the diffuse nature of the delinquency problem whould
imply the need for multi-facted approaches. But, the separatism does suggest
that even if answers were found, it is not likely that new knowledge would be
evenly applied nor would programs change significantly given the nature of their
differing definitions of the problem, target population, and intervention techniques.
What guidance can be given regarding the matter of problem definition? Can social
sciences play a role in developing strategies for concerted action? Insofar as
definitions are crucial to all subsequent activities, the definition of delinquency
constitutes one of the major issues to be addressed by the social sciences.
That the definitional dilemma is real is perhaps best illustrated when one
tries to think about delinquent acts in light definitions which apply not
only to criminal offesnes but to the so-called status or juvenile offenses as
well, it has been estimated that as much as 90 percent of all young people have 71
committed at least one act which could have brought them before juvenile court.
Acareful analysis of 2,490 "self-reported" delinquent acts by 522 teenagers in
Flint, Michigan by Martin Gold 7 2 revealed that only seventeen percent of the
youths reported that they had committed no chargeable offense within the past three
years. Hence, by definition, about 83 percent of the sample were confessed
delinquents. Generalizing to all of Flint's 13-16 year olds, Gold estimated that
somewhere between 10,560 and 11,220 "delinquents" were walking the streets at
thetime of the study. Given our added concern for those who might just become
delinquent, one begins to wonder whether there would be any youngsters left
over who would not be subject to conscious prevention intervention programs.
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A second major question emerges in relation to the stated program goals.
As was suggested earlier, social science data may not only be useful in helping
shed knowledge on the nature of delinquency (i.e. characteristics of the actor
in his social context) but may also be employed to examine the social control
For the most part this
agencies as they function and interact with delinquents.
potential seems to be largely ignored in the projects reviewed.
The target for change in most cases is either the delinquent, his family,
While these certainly constitute appropriate
the gang, neighborhood or community.
points of intervention, there is no reason why social control institutions such
as the police, courts, schools cannot also be included among the targets for
But, evaluation is aimed at determining the efficacy of one or another
change.
program, the subject of study is such that it takes for granted that social
control agencies cannot but result in anything except "positive" outcomes.
Few study the unanticipated conswquences which might show how, for example,
police judgements "create" delinquency, how juvenile court decisions add to
some juvenile problems, how the school actually encourages truancy, how correctional programs help maintain deviant identities and so on. It would appear
that social policies may be enlightened considerably should there be more data
showing the role these institutions play in the dynamics leading to deviant
behavior.
Much of what has been said gains support from 4 e current attention in
the social sciences which is given to the "labeling"" perspective on deviance
and social control.
Increasingly, it is recognized that deviant behavior is not exclusively
the result of disruptive and disorganized forces in society but reflect the
normal social processes of control which account for conventional behavior, as
well. Whereas sociological attention has been given to understanding the social
order to discover the structural conditions which encourage deviance, the labeling
theorists have been more impressed by the social processes which define, label
and articulate negative societal reactions which, in turn, contribute to the
Deviancy in this perspective is not an attribute or quality
deviant response.
in any individual but rather "a consequence of the application by others of rules
and sanctions". 7 ccording to the labeling theorists, deviant behavior is behavior
people so label.
7 5
speaks of "pivotal" categories which emerge as short hand
John Lofland
Categories such as "delinquent'
ways for people to impute significance to behavior.
are being constantly revised and re-created through the efforts of "moral
enterpreneurs" and "imputational specialists" - otherwise known as behavioral
scientists. The interesting fact is that the public's readiness to accept or
reject definitions may be materially influenced by these specialists. Yet, as
the number of imputational specialists increases there is a corresponding increase
in those who are imputed to be deviant. Social workers, psychologists, psychiapolice, teachers, etc. become proficient in the imputation of delinquency
trists,
and tend to "ensure the flow of persons" defined as such.

Unanticipated consequences of increased sensitivity may be illustrated
by the enlightened judge who in recognizing the importance of rehabilitation
refers more rather than less children to training schools. Similarily, as
of officers with more
one study has shown, a juvenile police department composed
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advanced training and academic degrees more often considered delinquents as
"problem-children" ameanable to treatment and thus, had higher rates of juvenile
arreis than a department where there was less"sensitivity' and accordingly
delinquency "crimes".
less
Enough has been said to make the point that the success of defining, identifying, labeling and classifying cannot be taken for granted any longer. Yet,
studies have not produced any substantial evidence that our programs can, in
fact, be more successful than what might occur by chance. Some have suggested
in this regard that the stigma and labeling influences may be so important they
should, under certain conditions, take precedence in decision making. For
example, Wheeler et al state,
Social policy formation.. .may not be able to wait for
the results of such research and it is necessary to
formulate a position on these issues without the
carefully gathered and assessed data that would support a more clearcut choice for one or another alternative. The choice seems clear; in the absence of
evidence on the beneficial effects of official contacts, every effort should be made to avoid the use of
a formal sanctioning system and particularly the official
pronouncement of delinquency. Such a position is justified
on grounds of the potentially damaging effects of the
labeling process. The primary reason for use of the
official sanctions should be the seriousness of the77
conduct and its potential damage to the community.
A third problem area which flows from the issues regarding problem definition,
and labeling, centers on the somewhat constructed concept of intervention as
evidenced in the preventative programs reviewed. Admittedly, programs vary considerably in seeking to remedy problems. Yet, in one sense at least, the alternative solutions seem to be fairly parochial, unimaginative and reflective of
typical solutions based on what is familiar rather than what may be theoretically
sound but practicably difficult inasmuch as few "models" exist to emulate.
8
To illustrate, Cohen's7 theory of delinquent subcultures states that
much of the delinquent behavior serves as a kind of solution to problems of
adjustment which stem from the press of middle class values on youths who are
suffering from status deprivation. The theory appears to go untested inasmuch
as there is no delinquency prevention models that bring representatives from
the middle-class together with delinquents in conscious ways so as to modify the
arrangement. Another illustration stems from the notion of the generation gap
and the degree to which delinquent responses may represent efforts to break with
the nrolonged childhood status. 7 9 Few programs have been developed to bring

adults other than parents together with adolescents to deal with intergenerational
struggles more constructively. Then again, absent in most all of the approaches
is any attention to the subjective experiences of the delinquents, themselves. A
reading of the programs seems to treat the delinquent as a passive object subject
to manipulation and change. This, in itself, tells a lot about the ways our program
continues to overlook fundamental realities and truths regarding the importance
of interpersonal relationships in the solution of social problems.
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The problem regarding definitions, labeling and treatment have not been dealt

with effectively in the research reported.

It is to be noted that generally where

rigorous research methods have been employed, as in the experimental research

designs, "verifiable" dato produced discouraging results. Studier repeatedly
demonstrated time and again that there "were no statistical differences" between
experimental or control groups, or that no differences were found in the amount
of severity of the offenses between those who received the treatment and those
who did not.
On the other hand, in many of the programs where such research controls
were not imposed, the findings were generally more encouraging. When left to the
judgements of the staffs, the program, planners, estimates of success such as
exemplified in assessments such as "significant improvements", marked progress
in behavior was offered as evidence that the method did, in fact, have an impact
on the participants.
Obviously, the determination of success had to rest on some agreed upon
indicators either of reduced delinquency, recidivism, better functionings, etc.
A range of instruments adopted in the studies discussed undoubtedly were designed
to get at these data. And, many of the findings rest on the ratings of success
and failures in these terms. But, the role of the various labeling instrumentalities such as police discretion, citizen complaints, predispositions towards
visible and non-visible deviant acts, are examples of some of the factors
neglected. Differing and changing reactions, varying efforts to enforce or
neglect to enforce or otherwise deal with behavior cannot but influence these
indicators. To rely on a statistical record in light of these intervening
variables case serious doubts on the utility of such indicators. Again, as
the more or less mechanical manifestations of delinquency to not only the
changes in individuals in questions but also to the identifying agents - schools
police, community - who play a role in determining whether a person becomes a
delinquency statistic. Of the studies reviewed, a few, if any sought to control
for such interevening variables.
In any event, the issue here is what constitutes successful intervention? Is
success to be measured in terms of "hard objective" data based on less than perfect
indicators or will success in the final analysis have to be determined by how
people feel about the problem? What rationale is there for showing that the
researchers who rely so heavily on admittedly difficult to substantiate data can
be found to be anymore accurate than the workers who are so immersed with the
clients? One, of course, may point to the self-serving interest of the workers
who claim success. But there is little to suggest, at least from this review,
that the researchers are any less identified with demonstrating success or
failure, although the methods of research obviously serve to check bias. Surely,
massive intervention programs cannot be based simply on clinical judgements anymore than they can be based on the findings of researchers who have limited access
to controlling intervenintz variables. The measures of success to be employed must
remain an important item on the agenda for legislative consideration.
In summary, it has been stated that at least four major problem areas or
issues seem to play a part in determining direction for future development.
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These concerns were evidenced in i.) the need for more accurate problem identification, 2.) the need for more careful attention to the role played by
social control agencies in labeling delinquent behavior, 3.) the need for reexamination of concepts of intervention and 4.) the need to balance and weigh
the relative contribution of practitioners and researchers in the determination
of appropriate directions for future police development.
These will be considered further in relation to legislative concerns and
directions.
B.

Re-formulating the Delinquency Problem

What are the implications of changing definitions in legislation. In
the first place, there may be a definite role in legislation regarding social
policies as to what should constitute delinquency. One direction may be to
marshal evidence to show that many of the behaviors now labeled as "delinquent"
may be "normalized" through redefinition. The most obvious example would be
seen in efforts to eliminate juvenile status crimes from the jurisdiction of
the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.
There is considerable evidence which shows how status offenses occupy much
80
for example,
attention of the juvenile justice system. It was reported,
that one out of every four children - 20 percent of the boys and 15 percent of
the girls - appearing before the juvenile court were there for the so-called
status crimes of ungovennability, incorrigibility, truansy, running-away offenses
A national census
which are "crimes" not for adults but only for children.g
of the almost 60,000 youths incarcerated in the 722 institutions throughout the
country in 1973 revealed that one out of every four boys and three out of every
four girls were detained because of status offenseso.2
Social data may be used to influence legislation in this issue as many
kinds of inquiries may be pursued. One can examine the stigmatizing effects
of being labeled deviant relative to the "social" harm of the acts. One might
note how ungovernable and incorrigible behavior is by definition an interactional phenomenon where the target for intervention would more properly
require attention to the social unit such as family or parent-child, teacherpupil diads. Another area which could be examined would note the significance
of adolescent "acting out" behavior which may, in fact, be a sign of health
rather than disturbance in that the developmental task of adolescence can be
interpreted as a period when normal outbursts occur which functionally prepare
adolescents for adulthood. One can point to the nature of the social system
which reluctantly opens positions, statuses and roles for adolescents.
Strategies may be developed to modify the social system to more effectively
accomodate the needs of potential adults rather than focus on revising the
needs of potential delinquents. And finally, such an inquiry could point out
the need for new interpretations of the role of social cnntrol agencies. Should
the juvenile court be a social agency treating psychosocial needs or can its
role be narrowed to treating youths whose behavior was clearly criminal? If
police do not intervene into the family, what other facilities such as school,
public social agencies, private agencies can play a role in re-defining and serving
the truant, runaways?
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The role of the social scientist in directing legislative attention may
prove to be controversial. Consider, for example, the testimony and congressional discussions surrounding two legislation proposals: Senator Mondale's
attempts to create a stronger alliance between social scientists and policy
makers through the creation of a Council of Social Advisors which would act
as a counterpart of the Council of Economic Advisors; and Senator Harris'
proposal for the creation of the National Foundation for the Social Sciences
to utilize social science knowledge in dealing with highly visible and social
problems, to offer polutions, and to mobilize funds, manpower and facilities
for their solution.04
84
pointed out, there is a certain historical mistrust
As Senator Mondale
on the part of many lawmakers regarding social sciences. The attitude is
partly because of unfamiliarity, poor communication or perhaps, because
lawmakers like to think of themselves as successful practitioners of applied
social science as witnessed in their ability to get elected to office. Many
see behavioral science study as a trend toward the society of Orwell's 1984
and are wary of invasions of privacy in social research, and fearful that
data banks will be abused and render the individual vulnerable.

But, he also indicated that if the social sciences had not been developed
the necessary sophistication to fully participate in determining social policy,
then they "must - and very soon". for government at all levels is going to
seek advice and value judgements which is a responsibility which may be forced
on the social sciences. The council of Social Advisors, argued Mondale, would
facilitate the Aansformation of social scientists into activists, from observers
to partcipants.
Similarly, in urging the creation of a National Foundation for the Social
Sciences, Senator Harris pointed out the need to enhance the status of social
science by legislative mandate and to acquire Congressional support to "Conduct
innovative and sometimes controversial research.,,5 As he states:
Social scientists should help to design as well as evaluate
programs and to sell them to the people, Overall, there is a
continuum from knowledge to power with active roles for social
scientists to play along this entire spectrum. But if we are to
get the political consensus necessary for real change, the people
8
also must gain that knowledge and exercise some power. 7
As a matter of practical politics, the passage of legislation requires a
constituency, inasmuch as most laws grow out of a need that has immediacy and
relevance for a sizeable portion of the population. Most proposed legislation
has some kind of constituency urging passage. To return to our example, any
social science support of legislation to eliminate status offenses from the
statutes is likely to be interpreted as a threat to the traditional authority
fo the parents who are traditionally backed by the law in their efforts to
control their offspring. Revising the arrangements may raise outcries although
it is not altogether clear that some modification is parent-child relationships
power relationships would not be acceptable.
For example, in a study 9
by Cohen, Robson, and Bates,

community reactions to parental authority done
it was found that the majority in the community
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would favor greater legal restrictions on parental authority over the child
than the law presently required. The community would have the law grant more
legally enforceable claims to nre-adolescent children than it now permitted.
Whereas the law by and large, does not distinquish between the preadolescent
and adolescent in granting autonomy, the community did recognize a need to have
the law accord increasing degrees of autonomy recognized in terms of increased
responsibilities as well as rights at the age of adolescence.
C.

Assessing Delinquency Prevention Programs

In addition to the use of behavioral science knowledge in assessing
human behavior and social institutions and in re-defining the problems of
delinquency, it seems likely that social science data would still be sought
to assess delinquency prevention programs and give guidance to legislation.
Given the limited nature of existing knowledge in this area, what would be
an appropriate role?
Certainly, the need for more and better research would be high on the
agenda. Few proposals would be supported unless attentign would also be
given to including some "research evaluation" component.o9 Moreover, it
would be urged that every effort be made to clarify objectives, procedures,
explicate methods of intervention, provide adequate and accurate reporting,
etc. But in addition to these efforts, there will have to be assessment and
interpretation of program proposals where social science data are simply nonexistant or unavailable.
One way to approach the problem would be to make certain that knowledge
from a variety of sources be used. A paradigm might blend theory, research
and experiential knowledge to be applied on a case by case basis. In other words,
it would seem that not proposal however conceived can be established on a
- the theoretical and
sound basis without paying attention to 1) t
conceptual framework underlying the proposal; 2) research - the way it takes
into account and builds on previous research; and 3) practice - how it draws
from or reacts to previous practice knowledge and experience. Similarily, it
would appear that legislators would be more receptive to arguments which
take all three factors into account. Decisions would be influenced by program
"concept" (theory) and the possible reactions of the public degree of "Scientific
proof" (research) and demonstrated usefulness (practice).
The paradigm, of course, is not new although it has perhaps not been
consciously applied in all cases. A few widely divergent proposals will be
briefly discussed to illustrate how it might be useful in providing a framework
for assessing delinquency prevention potential.
Consider a recent proposal for a preventative experiment by Cortez and
Gatti,5 0 Based on assessment of delinquency studies and especially the findings
on the role of the family in creating delinquency, they propose that pilot
projects be set up in different cities where there is the greatest delinquency
problem. All families with children under 7 years would be included in the
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screening process where Glueck's Special Prediction Scale would be used
to identify and predict the potentially delinquent families, not necessarily
potentially delinquent children. The thrust of the service would be provided
by social workers and psychologists in conjunction with government programs
to "develop techniques to tactfully and helpfully inform and train the parents
in the necessary modifications of their child-rearing practices and in their
relationship with each other. The proposal seeks to strengthen family life
relationships, attitudes and behavior not only in the home but in educational
centers and clinics attached to school systems and communities, as well. The
authors state, "The reader will agree that from every point it is more humane
and sound to oredict potential delinquency and concentrate our efforts on
preventing it rather than wait for a period of years without using preventive
measures in order to determine whether or not our predictions were valid."
The proposal may be compared to anotherby Hutschnecker 9 1 a number of
years ago which received national attention when it was suggested that mass
psychological tests be given to detect children who are apt to become antisocial and that special camps be set up to retrain them. Whereas Hutschnecker
tti prefer testing physical somarelies on psychological tests, Cortez and
totypes to "reveal delinquency potential."
Certainly, such proposals if backed by the force of law would raise
some serious constitutional issues especially if such tests are used as a
basis for removing a child from his home or as a basis for differential
treatment. Although Cortez and Gatti's proposal is limited to working with
parents who are receptive and cooperative, one can never be certain that
hidden social influences would not subject some families to unwelcomed
intrusion on basic liberties, family life styles, etc.
But, perhaps the more difficult problem aside from the legal question
is evidenced in the impression given that we do have the knowledge and techniques
to effectively help these families. What evidence is there to support such
a contention? Cortez and Gatti rely on what they see to be the success of
Healy and Bronner, the St. Paul Family Centered Unit, Tefferteller's material
on revitalizing parent-child relationships, among other studies. 9 3 They
argue that the preferred treatment should seek to strengthen the role of
the father, improve discipline and supervision, provide love and support in
the home and create cohesiveness and togetherness in the "good family life."
The porposal seems to overlook the anticipated negative effects of labeling,
potential abuses in the intrusion of the rights of individuals, "guilt by
association" when a child's test score becomes a family's problem and the
potential neglect of families not desiring help who perhaps maybe more a
cause for concern than those families who "are willing."
In terms of our paradign, such proposals may conceptually fit some of
the public impressions regarding the role of the family in the creation of
juvenile delinquency, and may have some theoretical support. But the
research evidence, other than the claimed successes of the prediction
instruments such as the Glueck scale 9 4 , lacks experimental data to support
the intervention method. Although there is some practice knowledge in the
studies cited, one would hardly feel confident that there is an adequate

treatment that could be applied without considerable refinement.
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and his associates
In another less ambitious suggestion, Wolfgang
provide data based on a birth cohert analysis of 9,945 boys living in
Philadelphia from the 10th through 18th years of age. Information was
gathered from schools, selective service lists, police and other records.
It was found that some thirty-five percent of the boys in the study had been
involved with the police at least once. Race and socio-economic statusus
(based on income) were the most significant factors discriminating delinquent
from non-delinquent groups. Although there was a greater likelihood that
other offenses would follow after a first offense, knowing the nature of the
first offense offered little predictive power concerning the character of
future offenses. The probability of delinquency increased with age up to
sixteen. Non-whites tend to be less "remidied" by police intervention but
in general the effect of intervention on the cohert was unclear. The authors
conclude that it would perhaps be wasteful to intervent prior to the third
offense inasmuch as 46 percent of the delinquent acts are not repeated. The
target for change in this view would be the individual youth who comprises
the largest proDortion of chronic offenders. It was found that the chronic
offender which comprised 18 percent of the total group of offenders was
responsible for over half of the offenses. As the author states, "Because
forty-six percent of delinquency stops after the first offense, a majority
of expensive treatment programs at this early point would be wasteful."
They suggest that intervention be held in abeyance until after the commission
of the third offense for an additional 30 percent of the second offenders
desist from then on 95
At least two problems may be raised. In the first place, little is
said about how to go about treating the third time offenders. Presumably
we are forced to rely on our out-moded unsuccessful approaches. Secondly,
there is in such a recommendation the implicit belief that the public would
accept as rational a plan which would allow about half of the offenses to
go unattended on the theory that such offenses would stop of their own accord.
Even if the treatment in rehabilitative prevention were effective, the
delinquency problem would still continue unless we learn to look at the one
or two-time offender quite differently than we now do.
Applying the paradigm, the concept although not likely to raise any
constitutional equal protection issues, would conceptually call for a major
re-orientation to the delinquency problem. While the research data are
convincing, there still are no experimental findings to support any plan
of intervention. And finally, practice knowledge seems to be taken for
granted insofar as the proposal implies that we know how to work with thirdtime offenders in a less wasteful manner.
A third illustration of a still different kind of study proposal which
could conceivably provide some guidance in delinquency was conducted in a
97
Based
small close-knit Italian-American neighborhood in Cleveland, Ohio.
the
neighborhood,
living
in
12
and
18
ages
of
the
boys
between
on a study of all
the study sought to determine the degree of social class heterogeneity within the neighborhood which influenced deviant behavior. Three major variables
were identified and found to be highly correlated: individual values and
behavior styles, family types and peer group associations. What was usually
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taken to be a homogenious social unit was seen to consist of interacting
social systems, locating the delinquent within the neighborhood maze of
sub-system influences could offer some potential for developing specific
preventative approaches. In this regard, one could argue for intervening
either in the family, individual or peer group.
With respect to the paradigm, the theoretic or conceptual arguments
would, although speculative, not appear to be controversial. Certainly, the
average person is receptive to the idea that these are the "important"
factors. Although the research showed that the variables were associated
there was no demonstrated cause and effect relationship nor was any specific
intervention technique tested. Social data would not be available to support
the merits of one or another treatment. And finally, it would appear that
there is much practice wisdom to support a proposal which seeks to deal with
such variables although again, much remains to be verified.
V.

POSTSCRIPT

When applying behavioral science materials to influence legislation
one often thinks in terms of a simplistic model. I would include a statement
of the problem, hopefully a fairly sophisticated study process culminating
in a final statement of findings recommending legislative change. Then, as
such scientific evidence would hardly be ignored by the
logic would have it,
law makers who are at their best when passing laws which would have the
sanction of scientific authority.
But, the process of enacting legislation is anything but logical for
it is more likely to reflect the ebb and flow of a series of conflicts and
positions lacking in internal consistency and continually sensitive to the
varying pressures and :competing interest groups. It may start with litigation
in a courtroom where a judge scrutinizes the constitutionality of a statute
in regard to a single individual. It may constitute a phase where collective
negotiations for compromise is sought without any attempt to charge the law.
Or there may be campaigns of direct confrontation between proponents and
passed or killed. Victory of defeat does
opponents pressing to get a bill
not necessarily mean that the war is over. Even when a law is passed, the
cycle may only begin again with new litigation over other issues.
Moreover, the desired change is anything but insured even when all
recommendations may be finally enacted and apparently accepted into law. In
this regard one may make a distinction between the instrumental and symbolic
functions of the law.
Governmental acts commit all of us to the public norms of morality.
When these laws are enforced and, in fact, control our behavior, then they
may be said to be truly instrumental. But some laws have only symbolic
value in that they command public affirmation but relatively little compliance
and are seldom enforced. There are, for example, "patterned evasions of norms"
which are more or less sanctioned ways of evading laws without being punished
such as is found in gambling, prostitution, public drunkenness. Such activities
in a functional sense act as safety valves minimizing conflicts between cultures.
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The law symbolically proclaims public morality on the one hand although the
behavior is permitted to persist on the other. This may not incidentally
be altogether bad for in this process other institutional foriced are often
mobilized to contribute to this public affirmation of morality.
One must be prepared to acknowledge these differential functions of the
law. For example, is the passage of a fair housing law condeming racial
discrimination in housing and employment which might provide significant
symbolic functions likely to satisfy or frustrate its backers if enforcement
is left to an agency wnich has no power bo enforce the law against offending
landlords and employers? Or should the Supreme Court dicision in Brown vs.
Board of Education be accepted as a victory when it can only be interpreted
as symbolic in nature? Indeed, the significance of how the law itself
functions should become part of the problem to be examined and assessed.
When the subject matter for legislation is deviance the problem is
even more complicated, for the public definition of deviant behavior is
itself changeable. It is open to reversals of political power, to twists
of public opinion and to the influence of social movements and moral crusades.
For what it attached as criminal today maybe seen as sick next year and
fought over as possibly a legitimate rate by the next generation. And indeed,
the lifting of deviant activity to the level of a political public issue can
very well be a sign that its moral status is at stake and that legitimacy is
a strong possiblility. But when community values and attitudes differ strongly
social evidence for change is likely to be viewed with suspicion and labeled
as anything but scientific.
We would like to think also that somehow problems will be solved where
social science recommendations are enacted into law. But, just as it is true
in practice that one senses that activities may bring about desirable results
they may also bring about unanticipated and sometimes not so desirable consequences for "clients" or for other parts of the system. This implies an
obligation to think through with the law-makers all alternatives carefully
noting possible consequences. This process is particularly frustrating when
one recognizes that our contributions are not very likely to be accepted unaltered into the decision-making process in any event.
These, of course, are just a few of the considerations. Perhaps as we
get more experiences in doing more influencing, the day will come when we
can do best in relating our knowledge and skills to the legislative process.
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THE DEMONSTRATION PROJECT AS A
RESEARCH & CHANGE STRATEGY

Leonard Rutman
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Ottawa, Ontario.

The demonstration project is becoming a major instrument for
social planning.
In sponsoring demonstration projects the overall goal
is for small scale "pilot" programs which include some form of research
to contribute to program change and policy-making (14, 16, 19, 21).
It
is generally expected that the lessons learned from demonstrations,
through the rigours of scientific research, will somehow result in large
scale adoption and major shifts in aims, styles and resources, and
effectiveness of social service programs. Models or prototypes for
future operational programs are tested to determine
their effectiveness
in meeting states objectives.
For this reason, they are undertaken
in natural settings which presumably resemble the non-experimental
1
conditions in which such programs might be later introduced.
This paper will attempt to elaborate the incompatibility between
the two primary goals of a demonstration project - evaluating the program
and using it as an instrument of change.
It will show the manner in
which the aim of using the demonstration project as a rational planning
instrument is undermined when research and change strategies are pursued
simultaneously rather than sequentially.
By examining a nationally
prominent demonstration - the St. Paul Family Centered Project - we
can isolate relevant issues and illustrate how this incompatibility is
manifested.
Although there is limited generalizability from case studies
writings by Marris and Rein (10) as well as Moynihan (11) support the
findings of this analysis. The advantage of a detailed examination of
a case study is that it provides an empirical and vivid illustration of
a phenomenon which appears widespread.
Moreover, it yields questions
for large-scale research.
Therefore, this paper is not meant to
describe the history of the Family Centered Project.
Rather, this
Project provides the empirical data for grappling with the major issues i.e., the demonstration project as a research and change strategy.

1
Although the expressed purpose is to use demonstrations for
rational social planning, there are other covert purposes for undertaking such projects.
For example, the funding organizations' purposes
could include such concerns as: postponing needed action, placating
particular constituencies or challenging existing programs without a
major concern for supporting data. And the groups who sponsor the
demonstration projects may be more committed to the implementation
of service programmes to which there is great commitment rather than
testing an experimental project.
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The Family Centered Project

2

In November, 1948, Bradley Buell and his colleagues from
Community Research Associates in New York conducted a Family Unit
Report Systems Study in St. Paul, Minnesota. The original purpose
of this study was to use it as a basis for developing a master
plan for reorganizing health, welfare, and recreation services
in American communities. St. Paul was selected as the sample city
for the purpose of data collection and 108 agencies provided information on persons and families receiving service during the particular month. A major finding of this study was that about six percent
of the families in St. Paul were using about 50 percent of the
community's services. Among these families who monopolized services
there seemed to be a high concentration of problems such as dependency,
ill health and maladjustment.
In 1952 the Hill Foundation in St. Paul provided a grant of
$90,000 for a three-year period to develop a plan for improving the
conditions highlighted by the 1948 study. A pilot project was then
undertaken in 1954 to implement family centered casework techniques
with "multi-problem" families.
Treatment was provided by social
workers who were loaned to the Family Centered Project by several
agencies.
This program lasted until 1959 when funds could not be
obtained to continue an expanded treatment service.
Unable to continue with the treatment program, the Family
Centered Project shifted its focus to a) training staff from various
agencies in the use of family centered treatment and b) the development
of a reporting system.
The aim was for the reporting system to
provide accountability by measuring the changing prevalence and
incidence of social problems and the success of family treatment
provided by workers in different social agencies. The Family Unit
Register was ultimately completed in 1967 to provide such accountability. And immediately afterward the Family Centered Project was
terminated.
Evaluation of Family Centered Treatment
Many experts in the field of evaluation research seem to
agree that program evaluation is often beyond the capabilities of
existing methodology (20, 23).
Since evaluations of entire programs
are so complex and because they have limited generalizability, a
more common strategy is variable testing - singling out specific
components of the program and testing their effectiveness in meeting

2
The data referred to in this paper is in the Family
Centered
Project Collection, Social Welfare History Archives, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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more iimiteo goats.
The research of the Family Centered Project
included both types of evaluation. This paper will not examine the
efforts to evaluate the St. Paul Family Centered Project.
Rather,
in order to concentrate on the focus of this paper (the incompatibility
of simultaneously pursuing research and change) the discussion will
be restricted to an examination of the issues involved in evaluating
a particular program component - family centered treatment.
The evaluative research design should be determined according
to the purpose of the evaluation, the characteristics of the program,
and the host of constraints (legal, administrative and ethical).
In examining the demonstration project as a research strategy, it
is necessary to examine the appropriateness of the research design.
In addition, considering the concern for using the demonstration as
a change strategy, it is important to identify the manner in which
the pursuit of spread and spillover affect the research component.
The Family Centered Project devoted considerable effort to
developing movement scales which could measure changes in the functioning of families, not merely changes of individual members in the family.
With the family as the focus, the concept of social functioning was
chosen as a basis for analyzing change in the following sub-categories:
1) family relationships and family units; 2) individual behavior and
adjustment; 3) care and training of children; 4) health conditions and
practices; 5) social activities; 6) economic practices; 7) household
practices; 8) relationships to the family centered worker; and 9) use
of community resources (6, 7, 8).
Information on the social functioning
of families was extracted from the case records kept by the social workers
On the basis of this source of information, independent raters completed
a Family Profile which included a seven-point scale for each of the subcategories of social functioning.
On this scale, adequate and inadequate
functioning represented the two extremes and marginal functioning was
the mid-point.
Through special research on the research instrument - the Family
Profile - there was statistical evidence showing that these nine
categories did in fact constitute a scale of social functioning. And
the procedures involved in completing the Family Profile were found
to be reliable (i.e., there was high consensus among people who independently rated the same families on the nine categories of social functioning).
This study could not determine whether the recording in the
case records was reliable because it only examined the extent of agreement among raters who read the case records.
Also, questions pertaining
to the validity of their evaluation procedure were not examined.
In
other words, it could not be concluded that certain changes took place
merely because raters were generally in agreement when determining a
family's level of functioning. To ensure validity it would have been
necessary to compare changes measured by this instrument with some
outside criterion.
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1. Demonstration projects and exploratory studies. An assumed
feature of demonstration projects is a clearly conceptualized treatment method or program variable which can be tested.
In reality, this
is often not the case among sponsored demonstrations. And in such
situations the project is not particularly amenable to experimental
study. Instead major attention can be devoted to exploring innovative
ideas and approaches which could perhaps ultimately be developed into
testable programs.
The type of research strategies required by exploratory projects (i.e., programs which lack a clearly stated program
and objectives) and demonstration projects differ. Formative research
would be appropriate for explorations and summative research for demonstrations (18).
Failure to recognize these differences often result
in inappropriate research designs which are consequently limited in
their use for planning purposes (22).
2. Monitoring the treatment process.
Evaluation research is
generally most concerned with outcomes which reflect the effectiveness
of intervention. Nevertheless, there are several reasons for also
monitoring the treatment process or program inputs:
1) to see whether
the treatment was actually carried out in the expected manner; 2) to
identify those aspects of the treatment which seem to account for the
results; and 3) to determine the variations of outcome resulting from
the manipulation of certain program variables (e.g., intensity of treatment, and practitioners' level of professional training).
Since the Family Centered Project was mainly concerned with
exploring ideas of family centered treatment, it would be expected that
the treatment process would have been the major focus of the research
efforts. However, this was not the case. The research publications
clearly show that the major emphasis was devoted to determining whether
change occurred for the families who were receiving family centered
treatment (6, 7).
The task of developing concepts of family centered
treatment was not totally ignored. Although this was not the focus of
the research activities, the Project Director carried out this responsibility.
On the basis of her meetings with workers and supervisors,
she articulated the concepts of the family centered treatment in a widely
circulated publication entitled the Casework Notebook (13).
This
publication did not, however, result in research which attempted to
associate outcome with the various components of family centered treatment which had been identified.
Instead, the research continued to be
primarily concerned with rating the families on the nine categories of
social functioning for the purpose of measuring movement which supposedly
was the result of treatment.
Demonstration projects are often viewed as missionary enterprises
in which there is a high level of enthusiasm among the participants.
According to the Project Director, the sense of complete investment
made by the practitioner was a stronger factor than casework skill in
regard to performance.
She claimed that in some instances improvement
took place even where the casework was on the slumsy side. This
illustrates the importance of monitoring the treatment process - partly
to determine whether outcomes are attributable to the Hawthorne effect
rather than the treatment approach.
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It is possible to infer the reasons for the major concern with
outcome results even when the experimental variable has not been clearly
defined. Demonstration projects are not commonly funded for the purpose
of exploring ideas and formulating testable concepts. Rather, they are
funded mainly to solve particular problems requiring intervention. The
Family Centered Project was funded for the purpose of reducing and preventing dependency. This necessitated data which would show whether the
results of treatment actually reduced dependency. In other words, when
demonstration projects are funded for the purpose of determining the
effectiveness of particular approaches to the solution of major social
problems, the research focus is on outcomes, regardless whether the
treatment or program variable has been clearly identified and monitored.
3. Outcome measures. The major thrust of the research efforts
in the Family Centered Project was the measurement of movement among
families receiving family centered treatment. And as indicated earlier,
the procedure for determining movement involved "before" and "after"
ratings of the families' social functioning.
Success or failure of projects are largely dependent on the
criteria selected for making such assessments. Although the rating
procedure was shown to be reliable, there was no assurance that the
ratings of social functioning were in fact valid. These rating procedures showed general positive change (about 65 percent) among the
Project families. However, studies which relied on more tangible
measures showed little change. The overall trend for the families seemed
to be an initial rise in public assistance costs and then a slight decrease
in subsequent years (2).
In a study of police contacts, there was a
small increase among children whose families were in the Project. Howeverpthe increase was somewhat less than the increase for children in
the whole community (1).
Thus, the more tangible criteria reflected little change while
the rating procedure showed considerable improvement. Yet the studies
of movement were widely published and used to convey the success of
the treatment approach. This illustrates the importance of critically
examining the success criteria to determine whether results are accurate
and objective indicators of success.
4. Use of control groups. Since the experimental variable family centered treatment - was still in the process of growth and could
not be clearly distinguished from other interventions which were in
common usage, formative research was needed. Such an emphasis did not
require a control group because the treatment variable that would be
offered only to the experimental group could not be differentiated
from the treatment approaches being used with families who might
constitute the control group. Nevertheless, the research focused on
testing family centered treatment. And there was considerable debate
over the inclusion of a control group. What is particularly interesting,
however, is the extent to which concerns about spreading family centered
treatment influenced the decisions.
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The presumed innovativeness and high visibility of demonstration
projects attract widespread attention, particularly since project participants appeared at public meetings, presented papers to professional
conferences, published papers and monographs, and conducted training
sessions.
Even before the concepts of family centered treatment were
clearly formulated, the impression that it constituted an effective
approach was conveyed throughout the United States and in other countries.
The goal of spreading the Project's concepts and methods was logically
inconsistent with the primary purpose of the demonstration project i.e., to test the effectiveness of the family centered approach. How
do you spread something which is still in the process of being tested
and has not yet been proven effective?
The Family Centered Project deliberately attempted to spread its
family centered techniques among the local social agencies.
This compounded the problem of obtaining a sufficiently rigorous differentation
between the experimental variable and the "traditional" casework
practices.
In other words, if a control group had been established and
if the results showed that their outcomes did not differ greatly from
families in the experimental group, this would not necessarily imply that
family centered treatment was ineffective. Such results could also
suggest that families in both groups received similar treatment because
the techniques of family centered treatment were widely transmitted.
As alternative to establishing a control group, it was decided
that families who had considerable contact with several social agencies
in the past provided a built-in control group; i.e., there was a type
of contrast control by comparing agencies' past experiences with these
families (which could be considered as unsuccessful because the family
still manifested many problems) with the current experiences under the
demonstration project. The weaknesses of such comparisons are obvious.
There was no means of determining the nature of the services provided
previously and the situations which brought the families to the social
agencies earlier may have differed substantially from the current circumstances in the type and severity of the presenting problem.
5.
Service orientation. There have been many writings on the
conflicts between research and service in evaluating social programs (12).
In addition to the administrative constraints which often necessitate
compromises in the research design, considerable attention has also
been devoted to the struggles between practitioners and researchers.
Collaboration between researchers and practitioners in evaluative
research can be mutually beneficial. A logical hypothesis would be
that practitioners are more likely to cooperate in research if the instruments have value for practice and if the research activities do not
interfere with their normal work patterns.
The Family Profile was
originally designed as a research instrument.
It was developed by
extracting categories of social functioning from the case records kept
by the practitioners. In addition to satisfying the research requirements, the practitioners found it useful as a diagnostic tool and the
supervisors found it helpful in the process of supervision. Data
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collection procedures involved a compromise. Caseworkers continued
open-ended recording in accordance with specific guidelines. And
researchers used this information to quantify levels of social functioning
for the purpose of measuring movement of the Project families. The
Research Associate of the Family Centered Project said that the reaction
of the practitioners to the evaluation efforts ranged from indifference
to mild hostility. Although the evaluation was primarily aimed at
examining the effects of a particular method it nevertheless constituted
a threat to the practitioners (5).
The Demonstration as a Change Agent
Martin Rein suggests that the concern of demonstration projects
for continuity (i.e., survival) usually results in abandoning the
strategies for promoting spread (duplication of the project elsewhere)
and spillover (using the demonstration as a catalyst for other changes
(16). This was not the case with the Family Centered Project. While
this Project received widespread national and international attention,
it was unsuccessful in its attempts to survive. Since this paper is
restricted to the pilot project phase when the major focus was on family
centered treatment, this analysis will be restricted to the termination
on this particular phase of the Family Centered Project.
1. Spread and spillover. The spread of the Family Centered
Project's concepts and methods were not fortuitous. Rather, there were
deliberate efforts to popularize this demonstration project. Even
prior to the 1948 survey, St. Paul was the focus of national attention
as the plans and purposes of that survey were described in Bradley Buell's
article "Know What the What Is" which appeared in the Survey Mid-monthly,
then a popular social welfare journal (4).
Soon after the survey, a
National Conference on Appraising Family Needs was held in St. Paul to
discuss the study's findings. This resulted in further national exposure
as 150 leaders in the social welfare field from across the country were
invited to attend this conference. One particular finding of the 1948
survey received widespread attention - that six percent of the families
in St. Paul were using about 50 percent of the community's service (3).
Yet this figure was misleading as it was computed by using the total number of families in St. Paul as the base, not the number of families who
were actually receiving service from social agencies. This point was
made by Frank Rarig, Jr., then Executive Secretary of the Wilder
Foundation in St. Paul:
... the project reveals that out of a total of 20,264
problem families and non-problem families, 6,466 or
32 percent absorbed up to 50 percent of the volume of
services in the study month - admittedly a slightly less
dramatic statement.(15).
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This particular result was used to justify a coordinated program
for families considered "multi-problem". In addition to the establishment of the Family Centered Project in St. Paul, the survey's findings
were largely instrumental in the emergence of several other related
demonstration projects: Winona, Minnesota, focused on economic
dependency; Washington County, Maryland, concentrated on physical
disability; and San Mateo, California, was mainly concerned with
behavioral disorders.
It was during the pilot project phase (1954-59) that concepts and
methods of the Project were most widely publicized. It is important to
note that this widespread publicity occurred during the demonstration
period, not after the methods had been tested and proven effective.
The presumed " innovativeness" of the demonstration project created
considerable interest in it, involving the dissemination of information
about the experimental variable - family centered treatment - even
prior to its final evaluation.
In 1962 a survey was conducted to determine the extent of multiproblem family projects in all communities of 100,000 or over in the
United States and Canada. Despite the lack of specificity in defining
such projects, it was found that in 1943 communities (or 60.1 percent
of the communities reporting in the survey) programming for multiproblem families was at some stage of thought, planning or operation (9).
Further evidence of the widespread influence of the Family Centered
Project is found in Schlesinger's publication which includes an annotated
bibliography of 300 items on the multi-problem family (17 ).
Efforts were made to assist local agencies to incorporate the
concepts of family centered treatment into their regular practice. To
facilitate the spread of the Project's methods locally, there were:
neighborhood meetings, a speaker's bureau, and training institutes for
staff from social agencies. The structure of the pilot project facilitated the "osmosis" of the Project's ideas as workers, supervisor and
executive directors of the participating agencies shared their experiences
with the non-participating staff. However, it was recognized that this
osmosis process was difficult to implement because there was a general
lack of interest in the Family Centered Project, as staff felt that the
Project did not belong to them and it was not pertinent to their regular
work. There was also the feeling among some practitioners that their
agency was not family centered and so why should they be interested
in the Project. It is interesting to note that there was some reluctance
among local practitioners to accept the Project's concepts and methods.
In fact, it was thought that there was more familiarity with the
Family Centered Project and greater use of the Casework Notebook outside St. Paul than locally.
2. Continuity. Demonstrations are generally funded for timelimited periods. Since their survival is generally dependent on
tentative funding arrangements, the extent of control over its own
program and its ability to influence long-term changes is somewhat
limited. Instead, the demonstration project's program and decisions
regarding the transformation of its approach into permanent programs
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belong to the organizations which have the necessary financial resources
to implement such changes.
The funding organization can influence the demonstration project's
activities through the disbursement of funds. When the Hill Foundation
renewed the funding of the Family Centered Project it included the
following tasks which would have to be pursued as a condition of funding:
1) formulating the concepts being used into transmittable form; 2) identifying, describing and defining the special methods used in the Project;
3) specifying criteria for measuring change resulting from treatment and
evaluation of treatment outcomes; and 4) developing specific steps for
bringing about changes in the community's pattern of organizing its
health and social services. These requirements reflected the focus which
the Hill Foundation as the funding body expected the demonstration project
to pursue. The first three tasks did not necessitate any major change
in direction; the treatment and research activities could continue but
the lessons learned from these activities would have to be clearly
formulated. However, the latter task - developing a community plan for
organizing services - represented a concern which according to the Hill
Foundation was neglected in the initial phase of the pilot project.
Although the initial grant was made for the purpose of developing a
community plan for the prevention of maladjustment among multi-problem
families, the pilot project was mainly concerned with treating them.
The community plan ultimately proposed included a centralized
unit with social workers carrying the major responsibility for casework services which would be monitored for research purposes. Throughout the community another group of social workers in their respective
agencies would only provide family centered treatment and they would
not be expected to make any major time investment in research. This
plan essentially called for an expanded treatment program.
In justifying a centralized unit, it was claimed that carefully
documented studies and evaluated experiences supported this type of
structure. However, there was actually no real basis for proposing
a central unit. There was nothing recorded to justify the necessity
of centralization, particularly since the alliance of social agencies
in the pilot project was considered a success. Nevertheless, a
central core structure was advocated because it would ensure that the
experiment would survive.
The Ford Foundation refused to fund this
proposed plan and the Hill Foundation could not continue to support
such a venture. Not being able to implement this plan, the Family
Centered Project abandoned its treatment focus. In its revised
request to the Hill Foundation, the change in emphasis was expressed
as follows:
our program calls for shifting our emphasis from
experimentation, research, and demonstration, to
the application of our findings of the past three
years into the work-a-day practices of our major
governmental and voluntary agencies (8).
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The Family Centered Project shifted its focus from proviong ramily
centered treatment to training staff in the local social agencies to
use this approach. This shift occurred largely because funds were
not available to continue the treatment program but the Hill Foundation
was willing to finance an endeavour involving the training of social
workers in the methods of family centered project.
Conclusion
The espoused purpose of demonstration projects is to ultimately
influence long-term change in programs and policies. This paper has
shown that attempts to simultaneously use the demonstration project as
a change instrument can result in inappropriate and less than adequate
research designs: focusing on outcome measures when the treatment
variable was not yet clearly conceptualized; using "soft" rather than
tangible criteria for evaluating treatment outcomes; and not establishing
control groups because of deliberate contagion. On the other hand, there
are formidable obstacles in using research findings as a basis for
program development. In the Family Centered Project, premature results
were widely spread to convey the impression that the treatment program
was successful. Due to the tentative funding arrangements it was
shown that the participants in the demonstration were limited in their
efforts to use the project as a change instrument. It was the sponsoring
organization that was able to influence the program focus of the demonstration that was able to influence the program focus of the demonstration
project. And organizations with sufficient resources to implement
programs could determine whether they wish to implement the experimental
approach of the demonstration project.
Despite the growing popularity of demonstration projects, there
has not been systematic study to determine the extent to which they
actually facilitate program or policy changes. In this regard, it
would be interesting to determine under what conditions and through
what process do demonstrations have maximum leverage in influencing
change.
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As new and innovative social welfare programs are being attempted,
there has been an increased concern with evaluating the effectiveness of
such programs. To what degree is a new program effective? For which
kinds of clients is each type of program effective? What elements are
crucial in a program which has been judged to be effective? These are
just a few of the questions that evaluators would like to answer.
There is a large literature on evaluation research--some of it
reporting or reviewing the results of specific evaluations (6, 8, 9, 10,
11) and some of it presenting general discussions, essays or models (1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). This literature outlines many important problems
and suggests imaginative solutions to a number of those problems.
However, in our judgment, some of the literature has viewed all evaluations as alike; insufficient attention has been given to the basic
differences between different types of evaluation. The objective of
this paper is to clarify this issue.
We argue that there are three distinct types of evaluation that can
be articulated on the basis of the intent of the evaluation: (1) The
evaluation is a test of some basic but general scientific hypothesis
that underlies or motivates a proposed intervention. 2) The general
scientific hypothesis is found or assumed to be valid, and the evaluation is an assessment of the effectiveness of a particular program that
supposedly embodies the hypothesis. (3) After a particular program has
been shown to be effective at some point in time, the evaluation is a
continuing assessment of the effectiveness of the program. An awareness
of these three types is important because the methods of evaluation
are partly dictated by the intent of the evaluation.
These three types will be referred to, for the nonce, as evaluationas-experiment (testing a scientific hypothesis), evaluation-as-assessment
(judging the effectiveness of a particular program), and evaluation-asmonitoring (continuously examining the effectiveness of the program).
Each of these will be discussed in turn.
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Evaluation-as-Experiment
As indicated above, each type of evaluation attempts to answer a
distinct question. The first question is a question of "pure science."
Suppose that X represents some intervention which is thought to
have some desired result, Y. Then, the evaluator asks: Is it true that
X will, in fact, result in Y. Under what conditions Z will X result in
Y? That is, he is interested in whether or not there is a direct and
strong causal link between X and Y; and he is further interested in
learning what other variables, Z, moderate or strengthen the causal
relationship.
A clear example of this is found in medical research on new drugs.
Suppose that a physician thinks that a particular new drug might reduce
some of the symptoms of, say, schizophrenia. He needs to determine the
effectiveness (Y) of giving the drug (X) to different types of patients
(ZI), in different dosages (Z2 ), and in different settings (Z3 ). Obviously
an experiment is the appropriate way to evaluate the drug.
Less clear examples of this are found in the evaluation of social
programs. Consider a program directed to dealing with behavior problems
(aggressive and rebellious behavior, withdrawal and the like) perceived
in some school children. Suppose that a social worker concluded that
the problems of these children were manifestations of family problems.
Since the social worker could not work with individual families he
decided to conduct small group therapy sessions, with, say five or six
families (i.e., pairs of parents) in each group; his decision was based
on the conception that through discussion with others, each set of
parents might gain some insight into their own conflicts and problems
and from that insight alter their interaction with and treatment of
their children. Thus, the general behavioral proposition that would
motivate this approach is that discussions with others who have similar
problems leads to insight into one's own problems which, in turn, leads
to change in one's interactions with others which, in turn, leads to an
alleviation of the behavioral problems in those others.
It may be that group therapy with parents has, in general, little
impact on the behavioral problems of offspring. It has some effect but
much less than, say, group therapy with the adolescents. Or, alternatively, the behavioral problems of adolescents may co-occur with failures
in school--academic and social failures--and further, the behavioral
problems are a consequence of the failures. That is, educational
activities which permit these adolescents some experiences of success
have the consequence of altering their other behavior which was defined
as problematic or psychopathologic.
Here, then, are three distinct principles (group therapy with
parents, group therapy with adolescents, experiences of success) on
which remedial programs could be based; there are many others. These
principles or propositions have the status of scientific hypotheses; as
such they need to be tested in a rigorous experimental fashion.
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An experimental investigation could, of course, be devised whereby
families are randomly assigned to one of several treatment groups (no
therapy or treatment vs. group therapy with parents vs. group therapy
with adolescents vs. experiences of success vs. group therapy with
parents and with adolescents, and so on), with the outcome measure being
some set of systematic observations on the behavior of the adolescents.
And these should be tested in a variety of contexts: (1) varying economic and educational background of parents, (2) type of community,
e.g., racially mixed or not, working class or middle class and so on, (3)
type of behavioral problems of children.
The point is not to show whether these treatments are effective or
not but to obtain some measure of relative effects. Thus, it might be
the case that, in general, group therapy has some effect but relative to
experiences of success it is of little importance. That is, if children
have some rewarding academic or social achievements in school, then this
has a greater impact than gaining insight into their own problems.
There are few instances of planned social intervention that have
been preceded by careful experiments conducted in a variety of situations. The problems of the day are so pressing that welfare personnel
clearly cannot wait until definitive experimental results are obtained;
they must create plausible programs and proceed in a trial-and-error
fashion. However, at the same time, some experimental investigation
should be conducted. The experimental investigation constitutes one type
of program evaluation.
Evaluation-as-Assessment
The question asked in the first kind of evaluation is a scientific
question; this does not imply, however, that the question underlying the
second kind of evaluation is unscientific. Rather, the second question
is a question in applied science.
The second question assumes that the first, the question in basic
science, has been answered affirmatively. That is, it has been reasonably demonstrated that under conditions Z a specified X has, in general,
a desired result Y.
Then the questions are the following. For a particular instance of
the intervention, i.e., a program of planned change that is operating in
some particular community: (1) do the conditions Z exist in the community?
(2)does the program embody the specified X, the agents designed to
bring the change? (3) are the desired consequences, Y, achieved?
An example from medicine may make this clear. A surgeon may have
discovered and reported that for patients of certain ages and constitutions, a particular surgical technique is effective in correcting certain heart defects. Over a period of time this surgical technique gains
wide use. Another surgeon might then be interested in evaluating the
effectiveness of this surgical procedure in treating patients with these
heart defects. The conditions, Z, then, are the characteristics of
patients for whom the technique is useful.
The change agent, X, is the
surgical technique. The desired objective, Y, is the correction of heart
defects.
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In conducting the evaluation the surgeon might learn that Y is not
achieved; a significant number of heart defects are not being corrected.
Several possibilities may account for this. The conditions Z do not
exist; the surgical technique is being used on inappropriate types of
patients. Alternatively, where the operation is attempted, it is not
being performed in the specified way; that is, physicians throughout
the various hospitals are not performing it in the way it was originally
contrived. In our formalism, the specified X is not embodied in the
medical care programs. Still a third possibility is that the original
research leading to this surgical technique was in error.
There is considerable difference between medical care programs and
social welfare programs; one difference, of course, is that social
science has not supplied general research findings that clearly dictate
one program rather than another. As we have indicated above, social
scientists should direct some of their efforts to obtaining this knowledge.
If the necessary basic research had been done, which had demonstrated that some principle is effective in ameliorating some social
problem,. then programs using that principle could be assessed. For
example, suppose that the definitive experiment had been conducted which
demonstrated that group therapy with parents and school success of
adolescents was significantly more effective than either alone and that
group therapy with adolescents did not have much additional impact.
And, suppose that this definitive experiment had articulated rather
precisely the nature of the group therapy and the experiences of success
so that the program could be copied easily in appropriate settings.
Finally, suppose that the program was begun in Community A. Now an
investigator in Community A wants to evaluate the effectiveness of this
program as it is conducted in his particular community. Since the
principles underlying the program havebeen experimentally validated, he
is not going to replicate the scientific experiment. Rather he wants to
know (i) are the principles and concepts of this program satisfactorily
embodied in the particular activities of Community A? and (ii) is there
a reduction in the behavioral problems of adolescents?
This investigator may learn that the desired results are not
achieved; there is no reduction in the frequency or degree of behavioral
problems of adolescents. But because he asked and attempted to answer
the first question above, he can suggest a cause for its ineffectiveness;
he learns that the program did not involve experiences of success.
Academic tasks that the adolescents could excel in were not devised;
there were only a few abortive social affairs, none of which resulted in
social successes for these young people. Hence, the investigator is
able to indicate why the program failed.
Although the first kind of evaluation requires an experiment, this
is not necessary in an assessment; this does not mean, however, that it
is easier. In the experiment, some outcome (e.g., reduced behavior
problems) in experimental groups is compared with that outcome in the
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control groups. In the assessment, however, some previously established
standard corresponds to the control group; that is, the investigator
compares the results obtained or observations made in the evaluation
with the specified standard. The conclusion about the effectiveness of
a particular program in a particular setting depends on whether or not
its results equal or exceed the standard.
Perhaps we have overdrawn the distinction between evaluation-asexperiment and evaluation-as-assessment, at least as far as evaluation
research is practiced, but we do believe that this distinction reflects
an important problem that has not been sufficiently appreciated by some
of those conducting evaluations.
Evaluation-as-Monitoring
The second kind of evaluation can merge into or become a third
kind: monitoring. Less needs to be said about this third kind; however,
it is necessary to keep the second and third distinct--both conceptually
and in practice.
Like an assessment and unlike an experiment, monitoring is directed
to a particular program-rather than to the class of all such programs.
The assessment can be viewed as a discrete investigation with a beginning and an ending. On the other hand, the monitoring of a program
is a continuous evaluation. It can be likened to the quality control
techniques of the industrial engineer.
The assessment of a program rests on the experimental evidence that
dictates the principles underlying the program. Thus, logically,
assessment follows experiment. Likewise monitoring follows assessment;
the monitoring of a program rests on an investigation that revealed that
the program was effective during a previous period of time.
Suppose for example, the administrator of a school mental health
program in Community A has had his program assessed with the result that
it is functioning fairly effectively. The next step he may wish to take
is to devise some means of continuously or periodically evaluating its
functioning; that is, he begins some procedure of periodically making
observations of the program in operation. These observations may lead
to immediate changes in its operation. Monitoring--the systematic and
periodic observation--is a "servo-mechanism" in the program; it feeds
back data which leads to self correction.
Conclusion
The evaluation of the effectiveness of social welfare programs is
an important and necessary activity. Among the many considerations-political, social and scientific--we have focused on one: the methodological issues of types of evaluations. We have argued that there are
three types of evaluation-all of which are necessary. In making an
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evaluation, an investigator should know what he is and is not doing; he
should see the formal relationship between his own research activities
and that of others, which though seemingly similar to his own, may be
different in some significant way. If an evaluator can locate his own
attempt at evaluation in terms of the structure of evaluation research
that has been outlined in this paper, then his attempt will be both more
efficient and effective.
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A Systems Approach."

EVALUATION RESEARCH AND EVALUATION:
SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENT AND IDEOLOGY

Michael Baizerman
Center for Youth Development and Research
University of Minnesota

INTRODUCTION
The idea that human services programs should be evaluated is accepted by
most practitioners and researchers. Discussion is about the technical aspects
of this research and about how practitioners can be encouraged to utilize evaluative findings in their everyday practice. Emphasis is placed also on the organizational barriers to this utilization. These ideas and issues are found in
a growing literature in the social sciences and, increasingly, in the even faster
growing literatures in the professions and in the human services, including the
social services, medical and health services, criminal justice and the like.
Here, evaluation research is discussed from a different perspective: as a
scientific social reform movement and as an ideology. Attempt is made to offer
a beginning analysis of some elements in the evaluation ideology and to focus
attention on some of the consequences of this ideology and social movement for
staff in human service agencies.
SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENT:

THE CASE OF EVALUATION RESEARCH

Evaluation (or 1 valuative research) is now accepted as necessary by many in
the human services.
Until recently this acceptance was often rhetorical; now
services are being studied, often at the request of service administrators who
are responding to laws, rules and regulations which demand program evaluation.
These requests and these rules have resulted from a successful social reform
movement which sought to make evaluation central to practice in the human services.
Evaluation can be thought of as a "scientific social reform movement" (Eaton,
1962). A scientific social reform movement is a type of social movement distinguished from other types by the participants and by the social legitimation sought
and given to the reformist ideas. Sources of this movement are found in early
sociology, social philosophy, and social reform (Caro, 1971). At base and simply
put was the notion that "science" could contribute to "making society better."
In the recent past, particularly since the War on Poverty programs, evaluation
has become a basic idea, one found in several forms.

For the difference between these notions, see Suchman, 1967.
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Evaluation research was a goal of those who sought to learn if programs
"worked" - legislators and social scientists among others. These people sought
to make research, in general, and this approach, specifically, a central process
in the funding and administering of human services. To practitioners in the human services, evaluation was a means of learning about their services so as to
make these effective. This idea included two notions:
the true desire to learn
about one's program, and, it seems, the preventive notion that unwillingness to
accept this outside monitoring could lead to more severe forms of outside control
and accountability.
The word evaluation came to be used by different groups of people to mean different things. The word diffused into many professional vocabularies - but in eac
vocabulary the meaning of evaluation was different. In common was the idea that
evaluation was a "good thing," something which "should be done."
Evaluation became part of a social movement which sought to counter critics of the human services at a time when the Great Society was no longer great, when funds for such
services became scarce, when the social philosophy and political style of the government became more corporate and efficiency oriented:
No matter which political party dominates the legislative process,
or which academic viewpoint is held at any given time, or whether the
mood of the country is for increased spending or cutbacks, constant modifications and innovation in human service programs is bound to continue.
There is every reason for dissatisfaction with the current state of intervention on problems of health, economic security, education, housing -- indeed on the entire range of social disorders that confront our urban communities ....
Numerous limitations surround current efforts at social action: inadequate techniques, scientific knowledge, and manpower are commonly cited
examples. . . . But knowing what to do and when to do it requires another
tactic as well. Neither the rhetoric of politicians nor the pleas of dogooders of various persuasions are sufficient to guide program development.
Similarly, neither the theories of academicians nor the exaggerated statements of efficacy by practitioners are an adequate basis for the support and
expansion of various human service activities.
Evaluation research, not a new but nevertheless an increasingly robust
enterprise, can have a major impact on social problems. While it would be
foolish to argue that all the deficiencies of current programs or all the
political and conceptual problems can be swept away by evaluation studies,
the adequate assessment of existing and innovative programs can be a vital
force in directing social change and improving the lives and the environments of community members.
(Caro, 1971)
EVALUATION AS AN IDEOLOGY
The ideology of evaluation in the scientific reform movement included several
notions: That "the evaluation findings can and should be utilized in practice;"
that "the findings are appropriate and necessary for management and program development;" that social scientists have the techniques to do evaluative research.
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And that policy and administrative decision-making about social policy, program
funding and the like can be rationalized, (outside of or within a notion of politics) and become more effective: i.e., social policy and planning using evaluative research as the technology for getting appropriate data would be an a priori
"better" way to decide.
Evaluation is a particularly powerful ideology of change because (by its nature) it blurs the distinction between the culture systems of science and ideology
(Geertz, 1964).
Ideology has the social function of making "an autonomous politics . . . possible by providing authoritative concepts that render it meaningful,
the evasive images by means of which it can be grasped."
(Ibid.):
And it is, in turn, the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to
make it possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts both for
the ideologies' highly figurative nature and for the intensity with which,
once accepted, they are held. ...
The differentiae of science and ideology as cultural systems are to
be sought in the sorts of symbolic strategy for encompassing situations
that they respectively represent. Science names the structure of situation in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is disinterestedness.
Its style is restrained, spare, resolutely analytic: By
shunning the semantic devices that most effectively formulate moral sentiment, it seeks to maximize intellectual clarity. But ideology names
that structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained
toward them is one of commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberately suggestive: By objectivizing moral sentiment through the same devices that science shuns, it seeks to motivate action. Both are concerned
with the definition of a problematic situation . . . Where science is the
diagnostic, the critical, dimension of culture, ideology is the justificatory, the apologetic one - it refers to that part of culture which is
actively concerned with the establishment and defense of patterns of belief and value.
Evaluation is an ideology which blurs the distinction between science and ideology:
Interest in evaluation research has been greatly stimulated in the
past decade by widespread concern for domestic social reform. Searching questions have been raised about the adequacy of organized programs
in such institutional sectors as health, justice, education, employment,
housing, transportation, and welfare. In an atmosphere charged with demands for rapid and significant change, a great many innovative action
programs have been introduced. Some reformers have urged that the quest
for more effective institutions be orderly and cumulative. They have
argued that careful program evaluation is needed as a basis for continued
planning and have recommended that the methods of social research be utilized in the evaluation of reform programs.
(Caro, 1971)
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Evaluation would be used also for policy and administrative decision making in
the domain of human services.
Evaluation as an ideology is part of the scientism ideology.

Both of these

ideologies fit into the model of a scientific social reform movement.
EVALUATION AS A SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL REFORM IDEOLOGY
Evaluation was the ideology of the evaluation research scientific social reform movement. This ideology sought to give legitimacy to the social change efforts of those who wanted to implement evaluation research in human services programs by arguing that evaluation research on a grand scale was a new and rational
way to decide about these services. In this sense, evaluation was a particularly
potent example of the scientific social reform ideology of "newism" (Eaton, 1962).
The newism ideology is "the presumption that new developments or practices
are superior to those 'not quite so new' or old." (Ibid.) In this ideology,
• . . the attribute of novelty is presumed to be indicative of
validity . . .
.
Plausible rather than well-documented facts are
used to support the theory that stylistic changes also represent a
gain in operating efficiency and durability. (Ibid.)
Evaluation research on a grand scale was the novelty in that it is presumed to
be a more effective tool for rational decision-making about human services. An
examination of the symbolism of the evaluation ideology suggests, however, that
the scientific social reformers sought more than the widespread implementation
of evaluation research of the human services. Using the ideology of evaluation,
they sought to rationalize the human services system. This is seen in the notion of "accountability" which is integral in the symbolism of the evaluation
ideology.
THE SYMBOLISM OF THE EVALUATION IDEOLOGY
Evaluation as an ideology is understood in part by an analysis of the "figurative nature" of its words, notions, ideas, metaphors and symbols; and by the
consequences of these symbolic forms on and for particular groups of people who
comprise the socio-political human services institution.
An essential character of religious symbolism is its multivalence, its capacity to express simultaneously several meanings the
unity between which is not evident on the plane of immediate experience . . . This capacity of religious symbolism to reveal a multitude
of structurally united meanings has an important consequence: the symbol is capable of revealing a perspective in which diverse realities
can be fitted together or even integrated into a "system." One cannot
sufficiently insist on this point: that the examination of symbolic
structures is a work not of reduction but of integration. One compares and contrasts two expressions of a symbol not in order to reduce
them to a single, pre-existent expression but in order to discover the
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process by which a structure is capable of enriching its meanings.
(Eliade in Edelman, 1971).
"Evaluation" can be thought of as a symbol in which are combined several
ideas, notions, words, meanings and social processes. Among these are "knowing,"
"monitoring," "research," "scientific," "applied research," "field study", and,
most important, "accountability." It is our notion that there is in the symbol
"evaluation" a meaning of "accountability," and that this meaning is, in turn, a
language of rationalizing, organizing and controlling. That is to say, the notion
of "evaluation" can be viewed as an "administrative language" (Edelman, 1967) by
which political control is exercised or attempted in the social domains of human
services as a means of bringing "order and reason" and socio-political legitimacy
to public and private expenditures for human services. Evaluation is a "managerial ideology" (Krause, 1973).
The word evaluation has come to include several notions, ideas, meanings,
and social processes. Among these are a type of empirical socio-behavioral research and a technology of learning about something (Robinson, 1971). To human
service practitioners, evaluation means a requirement that their program be examined by "outsiders." It is a research process in which data will be collected,
analyzed, etc., "to help us learn about what we are doing so that we can change
and correct it," or "really show how good we're doing."
It is something "hard,"
"scientific," "objective" and "scary;" it is something "scary" because evaluation is understood by practitioners to mean "accountability" in a new and different sense.
The Notion of Accountability
The notion of accountability includes ideas from sources such as moral, political and legal philosophy, and it has the formal meanings of "answerable to,
capable of being explained, and responsible to (for)."
In this last meaning,
accountability is found in the political idea that an organization has many constituencies which hold expectation of it, that some of these expectations and
requirements are about funds, "treatment" of people, "quality service" and the
like. Since the expectations and requirements cannot be learned about a priori,
it is necessary that facts be collected so as to learn about whether or not and
to what degree these expectations are "met." That is, "research" is a method of
learning about the agency. Evaluation (and evaluative research) is one type of
research (technology) which can be so used. Evaluation and accountability have
come to be joined in the mind of the practitioner.
Accountability also refers to the social process of administrative/political/management decision-making and control. In particular, to practitioners it
refers to fiscal decision-making - to funding and refunding. Hence, accountability means agency survival.
The symbol evaluation, then, includes in its penumbra the notion of agency
existence. This is one psychological and social reality for human service
workers and is likely part of the reason why evaluation is "scary."
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EVALUATION AS A LANGUAGE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

"Accountability" like evaluation are themes in the larger "human service
ideology" (Baker, 1974).
"Control" is one notion found in the ideas of accountability and decision-making in the evaluation ideology. Control over agency
survival is one example of this. Another example is in the idea that evaluation means to some a language of rationalizing and organizing, i.e., of controlling the human services "system."
These notions and ideas are found in the
language used to discuss accountability and evaluation.
Four sets of language are heard in discussions about evaluation and accountability: The language of the human services and politics long used by
participants in the traditional bargaining systems; that of the new bargainers new professionals, new client groups and the like; the language of corporate
business - efficiency, markets, PR, products, cost-benefit ratios - as this has
become the language of the federal executive branch; and the language of sociobehavioral research - as evaluation has become a means of achieving efficiency
and effectiveness.
The language of corporate business is a managerial language of "hardness,"
coldness, clear-headedness, and data.*
It is a language of ends, of goals and
objectives, and it is a language of numerality. Like legal language, it is a
language of specificity, of things which can be measured. It is a language of
objectivity. It contains words, symbols and metaphors which present images of
rationality, organization and order;** of facts and "science."
(Boulding, 1969).
This language brings semantic and cognitive order to the human service system:
inputs and outputs are clear(er). It is a language of control as order
and regulation facilitate management. It is a language which makes things "researchable" - discrete, clean, time-limited. It is a language of accountability.
It is a language of evaluation; of science; of scienticism - the ideology.
This language is not traditional in the human services, particularly in
small, private agencies; it is certainly not the language of the alternative
agencies. There are well-documented differences between the languages of research and human services (with clear exceptions in some branches of clinical
medicine and psychology, among others).
This was of major import to researchers who hoped early on to do evaluative research which would have utilizable
findings incorporated by service workers. Most practitioners gave symbolic,
not substantive support to their efforts (Eaton, 1969). Now the import is more
severe, for, as suggested, there is increasing congruence between the languages
of research and management. There is actual power to use the symbols. Language
has become one medium of administrative control over human services accountability.

*See Adams, (1974) for the relations between and among the notions and words such
as "hard - soft," "male - female," "right-handed - left-handed," etc.
**Contrast this to the notion of "muddling through."
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THE EVALUATION RESEARCH SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL REFORM MOVEMENT

Participants in the evaluation research movement sought the widespread
use of this research approach in the human services. They were successful in
that the idea that human services should be evaluated is now socially legitimate. It is found in laws, regulations and rules for the funding of human
services in both the public and private domains. The stated purpose of this
movement was to implement this type of research in order to make decisionmaking about human services a more rational and effective process. The argument for this position was found in the evaluation ideology - a culture system
with a symbolism and a language. In these latter was embedded the notion of
accountability. The social movement sought control of decision-making by offering a rational and seemingly objective way to insure agency and worker accountability. To achieve these ends, those advocating evaluation research had to be
accepted by, or to become, an elite group in the human services system.
In the recent past, researchers and evaluators were marginal to the centers
of decision-making in human service agencies and in the human service system.
The opportunity to change this status occurred after the Nixon Administration
reduced the War on Poverty and spending for other social programs. Funds for
social programs became scarce at a time when many programs were new so that
there was a high relative scarcity of funds. At the same time, the ideologies
of business, of management, of efficiency and of accountability were introduced
by the Administration.
The War on Poverty brought more than new human service programs and large
public funding for these. The ideologies of "citizen participation" and "community (control)" were legitimated. Attempts were made to include clients of
the service on decision-making boards. "New careers" were conceived and implemented. The poor, the minority and the "new professionals" were active participants on the local levels of publicly funded programs. These groups were an
emerging new elite in the human service system.
Regardless of intent, one consequence of the evaluation research social
movement was a challenge by researchers and their allies to the citizen participation movement: The rationality of research against the experience of being
poor. Evaluation was the ideology which gave legitimation to this new elite
of researchers (Krause, 1973).
The evaluation research movement challenged the older human service elite,
too. Here the issue was the "sloppiness" of human service systems. The parts
of the systems were disjointed when examined from the perspectives of client
service, interagency relations or the like. The old elite could be held responsible for these inefficiencies and for the lack of service effectiveness.
Evaluation in its symbolism and language offers cognitive and social means
to rationalize the human services systems (Rich, 1973).
It is a way to think
about and to achieve "order."
The problems of actually doing and utilizing
evaluation research of the human services are very real. Researchers, now
successful, may soon face a severe problem:
"How to deliver."
It may be at
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that point that the demands for evaluation research become modified. For the
moment, evaluation research "is in."
Examined next are some consequences of
this successful scientific social reform movement.
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF EVALUATIVE RESEARCH FOR THE HUMAN SERVICES
On the Level of the Worker
The language of evaluation is spoken increasingly by human service workers.
However, very often only the words are learned and the meanings are changed or
lost. When the meanings are kept, social control is gained for "language can
be thought of as a system of social control with vocabularies socially canalizing thought" (Pitkin, 1972).
Practitioners want and need evaluation research, hold unusual expectations
of it and are disappointed by its outcome. In response, they have created a
vocabulary of "reasons why not" i.e., why statistically significant findings
were not found:
--"The therapeutic relationships examined or the impact of the program is 'too subtle to measure with statistics'."
--"The presence of outsiders disturbs the normal conduct of the program or the group or the session."
--"Even though they may come back to prison, they are better or
happier or more emotionally stable people for having participated
in the program."
--"The effects of the program can only be measured in the long run,
not just during the first six months or year after release ."
--"The program or the technique is OK but it is not designed for
this particular individual."
--"The reason that the program failed is that it wasn't extensive
enough or long enough or applied by the right people."
--"The program is worth it if it saved one man."
baun in Weiss, 1972).

(Ward and Kassen-

Silly comments, defensive statements, these? To some ears, these can be
read also as a solid critique of evaluation research as now practiced. The
conflict in orientation between the researcher and the practitioner is clear.
This conflict is emerging into public discourse as another consequence of the
social movement for evaluation. Related directly is the issue of measurement:
What do the evaluation researchers measure in their studies? Often "objectives."
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Practitioners have begun to "manage by objectives*," to quantify expected outcomes to/in their clients and to measure these (most often with
the help of researchers).
Too often, only the easily measurable is examined
regardless of its centrality to the program, its management, or to its service ethos (Rich, 1973).
"Management by objectives" (MBO) is both a technology and an ideology. So too is "research utilization."
Measurement as
a technique used in MBO to collect data to utilize in programs is also used
in political and ideological ways. It is these uses which contribute to the
emerging widespread clash between practitioners and researchers (Rich, 1973).
For the worker, evaluation research means records, forms and instruments.
To him, his success and failures become numbers, not people. Often, he tries
to get around these papers. He fudges. He gets cynical, often angry. He
begins to avoid certain tasks. There emerges a deviant social role for the
human service worker.
Another consequence of evaluation often is that the instruments of the
process - the forms and records and the like - become incorporated and institutionalized. Information sought for one end is used for no end. More red
tape and bureaucracy follow, with the attendant difficulties in changing these
ways.
Yet another consequence is that the data are moved from the practitioners
and the managers to the researcher who designs, collects, analyzes, interprets,
etc. - all in his own corner. In turn this seems to make the goal of management utilization of findings more difficult to achieve. Further, this contributes to a sense by workers that the researcher is an "outsider" - one who is
hard to reach, who doesn't understand practice, etc. And, maybe most important,
the practice of organizationally separating research from practice and researchers from practitioners is to disengage the worker's act of giving treatment from
(a) feedback about the act and the particular worker - client dyad; and (b) the
worker's professional responsibility for that act. Responsibility and moral
accountability becomes effectiveness - "did it work? The researcher will tell
me." The idea of and the social values basic to professional practice and professionalism are changing.
On the Systemic Level
Along with emerging notions of professional behavior and responsibility
are other consequences of the institutionalization of the evaluation ideology
in practice. Among these are the following.
A new form of social legitimacy and social control of the human services
has emerged. With this has come a new elite:
social scientists, and systems
and operations-management people. These people, styles and ideologies are

*See Rhinelander, (1973) for suggestive comments about the "optical model" of
the mind and the relation of this to notions of "objectivity" and, by extension "objectives."
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important participants in the socio-political bargaining systems of the human
services. This is a gain for the technocrat and the methodologist.
A third consequence is panic on the part of practitioners and managers as
they begin to see that the question of "does it work?" could lead to their program being closed. A finding of "no proof of effectiveness" can be a death
certificate.
Another consequence can be thought of as the "achievement crisis" (Eaton,
1974); researchers will have to produce too. They will have to devise technologies of evaluation which will meet the needs and wants of the socio-political
decision-making process or else they will lose the legitimacy which governs
their elite status in these decision systems.
Last, here, is the consequence of feeling hopeless because the human services have been "captured by outsiders."
Where does this leave the practitioners?
BEHIND THE 'RHETORIC OF RECONCILIATION'
The practice of the rhetorical reconciliation helps to explain
how American society escapes many of the strains that might be expected when its professed ideals conflict with many of its accepted
practices. There is a tendency to describe accepted practices in
ideologically acceptable terms, whether or not the terms are truly
descriptive of practices . . . What is significant is the metamorphosis of the normal language shifts in American society into a
rhetorical reconciliation between opposing practices and beliefs;
a reconciliation that serves to perpetuate the conflict by rationalizing practices and delaying changes in ideology. (Skidmore, 1970).
There is always hope of a reconciliation between differing views - here,
between practitioners, researchers, decision-makers of policy and funding, the
"public" in general and organized constituencies in particular. This is a
basic tenet of our political ideology and a basic perspective in the sociopolitical analysis of individual and group wants and needs.
There is a possibility, though, that the very success of the evaluation
social movement has institutionalized words, notions, ideas, symbols and social processes which are at root inherently different, as different as art and
science; and that at best there are but tangental ways in which these culture
systems overlap and can be brought into mutual support on the level of workers
and clients. It is our task to find these points, for without them, we will
clothe our art in robes of scientific rhetoric and be no better for it. Our
responsibility is to search for a fit between research and practice in the
service of our ideals.
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ANTI-POVERTY POLICIES AND EVALUATION:
A CRITIQUE OF THE PLURALIST CONCEPTION
OF POLITICS AND EVALUATION
Robert D. Herman
School of Administration
University of Missouri - Kansas City, Missouri 64111
The beginnings of U.S. federal evaluation research can, in descriptive historical terms, be located in McNamara's Department of Defense and the
later requirement that all federal government agencies adopt a Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System. While the formal PPB system was discontinued
in 1971, the analytical or policy evaluation activities it required, still
live on, especially in agencies dealing with human resource development and/or
social welfare programs (Schick, 1973, Wholey, et al, 1970). Given the recent
advocacy of increasing and improving federal evaluation efforts, I think it
important to examine some of the assumptions and consequences of those
assumptions of the general evaluation research model, particularly in regard
to anti-poverty policies.
Evaluation research, whether it be of anti-poverty policies or courtordered school-desegregation programs, is much like other social science
research. The chief difference is that the hypothesis of evaluation research
is, on a very general level, that some governmental agency program has achieved
its intended goal. While this simple statement in reality often involves
dealing with a whole host of methodological and organizational problems, the
point is that evaluation research is intended to be useful to decision-makers.
Evaluation research is not primarily concerned with theory building and theory
testing, but with practical "real-world" affairs. This makes evaluation
research important and often controversial. It is controversial because it can
effect (or is perceived as such) the budgets, staff size and power of various
agencies and the distribution of public benefits to various classes or
categories of citizens. It is important because methodological and empirical
issues - such as sample size and representativeness, validity and reliability
of measures, accurate operationalization of program goals, and appropriateness of causal models and inferences - now have (or are perceived as having)
immediate and direct political consequences.
Some evaluations, for instance, the Coleman report and the Westinghouse
Learning Corporation - Ohio University study of Head Start, have become centers
of controversy. It has been argued that criticisms of these evaluations, while
explicitly directed toward methodological issues, are basically politically and
ideologically motivated (Williams and Evans, 1969; Weiss, 1972).
The implication seems to be that such criticism will severely hinder not only the utilization of the given specific evaluation study, but will also retard the extension
and improvement of evaluation generally. When evaluation advocates call for
de-politicizing evaluation, they are not claiming the evaluation is not part of
the political process or that evaluation does not have political implications.
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Rather, evaluation must be de-politicized so that it can help make political
decisions more rational by supplying evidence (of an "objective or disinterested"
character), which presumably is equally available to contending parties, on
which to make decisions about maintaining, expanding, modifying or abandoning
programs intended to achieve some general policy goal. That is, in order for
evaluation to be useful, the design, implementation and data analysis phases
of evaluation must be free from pressures that would or could bias the outcome(s) in one direction or another. Indeed, much of the recent literature
about evaluation is concerned with such issues as quasi-experimental designs,
causal models, the proper organizational locus of evaluation projects, and
multi-variate statistical methods (see, for instance, Rossi and Williams, 1972;
Wholey, et al, 1970; and Weiss, 1972). In order for these evaluation phases
to be free of biasing pressures, this requires that parties interested in a
policy area eschew political-ideological attacks upon evaluation. It is in
this sense that evaluation research needs to be de-politicized and its
a-political or disinterested character preserved, recognized and enhanced.
This is, I submit, the typical frame of reference for considering the issue of
politics and evaluation.
All the policy evaluations and discussions of politics and evaluation
that I've seen assume or accept the dominant theory of the U.S. political
system - pluralism*. Thus, policy goals are viewed as the result of bargaining
among various coalitions of interest groups. Such coalitions are not stable,
but shift as issues or classes of issues change. Each interest group has
limited power and consents to the "rules of the game."
Such bargaining results
in piecemeal, incremental policies. In this view, all citizens are seen as
essentially similar, each having equal access or opportunity to participate in
the political arena. Figure I presents a highly simplified schematic diagram
of the pluralist view of the political system and the place of evaluation in
the system.
Evaluation comes at the "end of the line" of a cycle and provides
feedback in the (intended) form of "objective" or "disinterested" evidence about
the outcomes of a policy decision.
This evidence is then to be used in the
following cycle.

*While some have distinguished different varieties of pluralism, for the
purposes of this paper, all pluralisms are essentially the same.
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Figure 1
Pluralist Model of Political System
(Including the location of evaluation)
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and their

But does the pluralist perspective adequately account for policy
decisions concerning the poor - such as the creation, passage and implementation of the Economic Opportunity Action and its provisions for Community Action
Agencies and Community Action Programs? And if it does not, what does this
imply for the appropriateness of the traditional evaluation approach? The
fundamental axiom of pluralism is that policy decisions are the result of
bargaining among interest groups that have some power, and that have something
(symbolically but especially materially) to gain or lose from the decision.
While the poor apparently had something to gain from the Economic Opportunity
Action and from Community Action Programs, to what extent did the poor act as
an interest group in framing or in securing approval of the Economic Opportunit
Act? Levitan (1969) shows that various interest groups, mostly federal departments and agencies such as HEW, Labor, Commerce, and the Bureau of the Budget,
did indeed bargain over, and arrive at compromises about substantive and
administrative issues. However, nowhere is there any evidence that the poor
were involved in the decision process. Sheppard (1969: 487) puts it succinctly
"Unlike other class-related laws, in this case the law was only remotely - if
at al] - the result of lobbying or direct pressuring by the class intended to
be positively affected."
Most analysts of the political history of the Economic Opportunity Act,
though sometimes puzzled by it,
are not much concerned with explaining this
apparent anomaly, preferring to see governmental decisions as being not just
the result of pluralistic bargaining, but also, on occasion, the result of a
rational, more or less disinterested, professional solving orientation (see,
for instance, Donovan, 1967; Sundquist, 1968; Rubin, 1969; Marris and Rein,
1967; Moynihan, 1965; and Moynihan, 1969). The pluralist-problem solving
perspective, thus, sees the War on Poverty as originating in the recognition of
poverty as an important social problem by professionally trained social scienti.
in foundations, universities, and goverment who were able to influence sympathetic politicians in the Democratic administration.
Many of the specific
programs, such as Community Action Program, are seen as attempts to apply, to
some extent, social science concepts and theories, to important social problems
The War on Poverty programs, to the extent that they are based on social scienc
theories at all,
are based on or congruent with the cultural or sub-cultural
theory of poverty (Valentine, 1968).
While the cultural theory of poverty, and
its chief rival, the situational theory are not well-developed theoretically
(Spilerman and Elesh, 1971; Herman, 1974), the cultural perspective sees (hardcore) poverty as the result of socialization in a sub-culture that produces
personality characteristics and orientations (such as fatalism, preference for
immediate gratification, feelings of powerlessness, etc.) that prevent such p00
from taking "full advantage of the changing conditions or increased opportuniti
that may occur in their lifetime." (Lewis, 1968: 6) Thus, traditional evaluations of anti-poverty programs would attempt to assess to what extent such
programs (in their various forms) resocialized, changed the personalities, of
the poor who were, in some way, included in the program. This was certainly th
case in Westinghouse-Ohio University evaluation of Head Start, and appears to b
the case in evaluations of Community Action Programs.
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This seems reasonable enough as far as it goes, but does it go far
enough? It does not, if there is another perspective that more adequately
accounts for the War on Poverty programs. An elite or limited pluralism
perspective provides a more convincing explanation of the War on Poverty.
As developed by Gamson (1968), in an important but much neglected article, the
U.S. political system can best be described as one of limited pluralism.
Gamson agrees that the political system contains multiple centers of power,
but then argues that the political system normally operates to prevent incipient groups from achieving full entry into the political system, and thus such
groups are unrepresented in the political system.
Represented groups do
indeed bargain and compete among themselves, but they also cooperate (whether
hinder
intentionally or not is uninportant) to maintain the boundary (i.e.,
entry) to the political system. For instance, the creation of political organization among unrepresented groups is discouraged by such general social
conditions as (1) a lack of access to information about the effects of political
decisions, (2) the lack of politically experienced and skilled leaders, and (3)
the "culture of subordination".
The political establishment can and has undertaken more specific actions that discourage the formation of interest groups and
their inclusion in the political system. Such boundary maintaining activities
include: (1) attempts to undermine the legitimacy of a developing interest group;
(2) harassment of leaders; (3) co-optation of leaders; (4) going around leaders
of a developing interest group and appealing to members and potential members to
reject the interest group and its leaders as their representative; and (5) incrementalism in the resolution of major social issues. Gamson explicitly points
out that all citizens are not the same. Social stratification of citizens
affects access to and resources available for participation in the political
system. Figure 2 presents, once again, a simplified and heuristic diagram of
the elite or limited pluralism perspective.

Figure 2
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Implementation

Since most research on the poor has been concerned with investigating the culture
or subculture of poverty, the psychological characteristics of the poor, and the
impact of programs desiCned to resocialize the poor, there is little direct data
available to assess the extent to which the poor, or what and which proportion of
the poor, are unrepresented in the political system. However, I think it safe to
contend that for the most part, and in comparison to more privileged socioeconomic classes, the poor are unrepresented.
The elite or limited pluralism perspective sees governmental policy
decisions, especially those dealing with or "for" the poor (or for other unrepresented groups), not as exercises in consensual problem-solving, but rather as a
means of winning elections without alienating established interests in (i.e.,
while maintaining the stability of) the political establishment. Though Piven
and Cloward (1971) do not explicitly utilize Gamson's model of the political
system, their analysis of the functions of welfare fits very nicely with and
illustrates Gamson's views. Piven's and Cloward's (1971) primary thesis,
supported by chronological data they present, is that expansive welfare
policies (increasing expenditures, "loosening" requirements) function to dampen
civil disorders, while restrictive policies (decreasing expenditures, "tightening" requirements) function to reinforce work norms.
Betz (1974) recently
provided additional empirical support for this basic thesis when he demonstrated
with cross-sectional data that cities experiencing riots had significantly
larger increases in welfare expenditures the year after the riot than non-riot
cities.
Thus, there is evidence that supports the proposition that welfare
policies are not attempts to solve the poverty problem. (See also oroff
(1974).) Rather, the functions of welfare policies are to win elections
(either by creating and appealing to the prejudices of working and middle-class
people or by "buying" the votes of the poor) and maintain the stability of the
political system (either by heading off changes in the political system that
civil disorder might bring about or by emphasizing, to both the poor and nonpoor alike, the necessity of work).
In the course of documenting this basic thesis, Piven and Cloward (1971)
offer an explanation of the origins and functions of the War on Poverty that is
consistent with their basic thesis and with Gamson's theoretical model of the
political system, and at odds with the pluralist problem-solving accounts.
Briefly, they argue that by the 19 6 0s most local urban Democratic parties were
unconcerned with and hence unresponsive to the black and poor in the cities.
The national Democratic party and its
candidates, though, were dependent on
In order to do this, the federal govern
capturing and holding this constituency.
ment intervened in local welfare arrangements, not directly through liberalizing
legislation, but indirectly by creating programs, such as the Economic Opportunit
Act and its provisions for Community Action Programs, that helped to mobilize
Regardless of the intentions of the key
pressure against local welfare policies.
political actors, the War on Poverty and its Community Action Programs, by
circumventing local Democratic establishments, functioned to overwhelmingly
secure the inner city poor and black vote for the national Democratic party,
and its candidates - Kennedy and Johnson.
However, in some cities the conflict
between the poor and the local political establishment (often Democratic) became
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so intense that mayors and others contended that the stability of the political
system was threatened. The opposition of big city Democrats and their allies
can account for the retreat from citizen participation in Model Cities programs
established by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of
1966 (Cole, 1974); Strange, 1972). Unlike CAA programs, all federal funds for
Model Cities programs go directly to the municipal government, thus reestablishing local political control over the programs.
It is, of course, unrealistic to expect evaluation studies conducted or
sponsored by the government to depart from a reliance on the pluralistic problemsolving model of the political system or to go beyond investigating the extent
to which formal policy goals (no matter how multiple, vague or broad they may
be) are achieved, and at what cost-benefit ratio. However, the point of this
exercise is to show that traditional evaluation can not be truly de-politicized.
Evaluation, particularly of anti-poverty or other social welfare policies, can
not but be political, even in its research phases, being based on the pluralist
theory, evaluation research is constrained to raise only certain issues and
hypotheses.
Evaluation, in this view, functions (whether intentionally or not
is unimportant) to reaffirm the pluralist view, and to focus analysis on specific programs rather than on the political system which produces them.
One sometimes senses that evaluators and evaluation advocates are uneasy
about the narrowness of evaluation research.
For instance, Weiss (1972: 334) in
a section titled, "Implications of Evaluation: A Radical Critique" argues that
"in
a basic sense, the bent toward the negative that is characteristic of
social action evaluations is not something to be masked or shunted aside. To
the extent that null results are real and not an artifact of primitive methodology, they betoken serious weaknesses in social programming." Later she
concludes that "it is time we recognized the failure of our moderate, piecemeal,
cheap solutions to basic social problems. They have been tried and evaluation
research has found them wanting. Bold experiments are called for. It is a
fraud to perpetuate variations on outmoded solutions to problems that are rooted

in our system of social stratification." (Weiss, 1972: 337)
If the elitist model presented here has any validity, and I think it has
a great deal, it implies for those of us concerned with analyzing poverty and
inequality and attempts to reduce it, that we not allow formal policy goals and
their evaluations to define the entire field of investigation. Additional issues
and questions need to be raised. It implies that relying exclusively on the
government (or more broadly, the political system) to seriously do something
about reducing poverty and inequality is foolhardy. Finally, it implies that
poverty and inequality might be more effectively reduced by focusing on ways
of promoting the formation of interest groups among the poor and of easing entry
into and changing the established political system. That is, the problem of
poverty might be more fully solved if we analyze and find ways of changing the
policy process, instead of analyzing and changing only the policies.
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INTRODUCTION

1
As has been pointed out by a host of writers, a crucial issue in
conducting evaluative or action type research is the problem of gearing an
appropriate research design into the cogs of organizations, ensuring that
once initiated the evaluation is in fact conducted according to the original
design, and that the results of the study are utilized in policy formulations
and ultimately in program development. The focus of this case study is on the
major political and administrative problems and processes involved in planning,
conducting, and utilizing the findings from a field experiment dealing with
the relative effects of parole supervision as provided to a group of juvenile
aged boys and girls.
An assumption of the paper is that many of the problems encountered in
the process of conducting evaluation research in the field of Corrections will
have relevance to a variety of projects in different substantive fields.
Accordingly, there is a need for illustrative case material dealing with the
problems involved in planning and conducting the research as well as in
utilizing the findings derived from an evaluation project. The hope is that
such material will accumulate to provide insight into the pecular nature of
the socio-political processes endemic to this work, help to illuminate issues,
suggest general propositions and indicate avenues for conflict resolution.
The case study reported on here centers on an examination of outcomes
resulting from the provision of differential parole supervision to juvenile
aged boys and girls released from the two major state-level correctional
institutions in Minnesota beteen August 1, 1970 and May 31, 1971.
The aim
was to determine whether juveniles released from institutional settings would
adjust as well on parole without formal supervision from parole officers as a
corresponding group receiving conventional parole supervision. Viewed in
chronological sequence, five major steps were involved in implementing the
research: (1) the identification and assignment of boys and girls from the
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two institutions to a study pool, (2) random assignment to experimental or
control status from within the study pool, (3) release on parole, (4)
provision of either conventional parole supervision or no parole supervision
to the respective groups, (5) evaluation of outcomes on parole. In short,
the formal design of this research took the form of an "after-only" field
experiment.
Prior to the actual implementation of the study design considerable
time and effort were devoted to planning with the relevant administrative
units of the Department of Corrections.
While detailed attention to defining
relationships with the various units involved in the conduct of the research
at the outset was time consuming and frustrating, none the less it was to be
The
an essential pre-condition to the successful conduct of the project.
assumption was that if the research could be fitted into the normal operations
of the agencies concerned, resulting in only mild disruption in routines, the
probability of receiving continued on-going administrative support and cooperation would be greatly enhanced.
The pertinent administrative units dealt with included the Parole
Division of the Department of Corrections as the administrative unit responsible for providing parole supervision to all
juveniles released from stateoperated correctional institutions.
This division was made up of parole
officers, supervisors and administrators scattered throughout the state.
The
Youth Conservation Commission or parole board was a further key administrative
unit as it was responsible for decisions on the placement and release of youth
in state correctional institutions.
Finally, the two correctional institutions from which samples were to be selected were obviously relevant.
Because the project involved some departures from agency "business as
usual" detailed discussions of the general purpose as well as its implementation were carried out to help ensure that the research would be conducted with
a minimum of confusion and in accordance with the originally agreed upon
procedures.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PAROLE BOARD
Once the members of the Parole Board had formally agreed to the conduct
of a study that proposed to assess the relative impact of "regular parole
supervision" and "no parole supervision" with juvenile boys and girls, two
major questions had to be resolved. First, was it necessary for all youth to
receive parole or could some youth be given flat discharges from the institutions? A further question concerned the kinds of restrictions to be placed
upon the sample selection procedures by this releasing authority (i.e.
what
youth would not be eligible for no parole supervision)?
The latter issue generated heated dscussions between the researchers
and the parolling authorities. On grounds of greater potential generalizability of research findings, the investigators preferred that the study be
conducted with no restrictions on the kinds of youth to be placed in the sample
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selection pool; the simple fact of imminent release on parole would constitute
the only logical basis for random assignment. On the other hand, the releasing
authority felt responsible for potentially endangering either communities or
particular parolees as a result of releasing certain youth without the presumed
benefits of parole supervision.
Involved here was an overriding concern on
the part of the Board members with what they saw as a distinct possibility of
engendering negative reactions from community members due to the sampling
requirements of the study. This possibility, moreover, had to be of concern
to the investigators, for if a youth were released on parole without supervision and subsequently became involved in a serious criminal offense, a cause
and effect link - no matter how spurious - might be imputed and lead out to
pressures to terminate the study. As political appointees, members of the
Parole Board could reasonably be expected to withstand only limited pressures
from the community; particularly if those pressures were directed against
research. This issue was finally resolved by the two parties agreeing that
certain categories of youth would be kept out of the pool from which samples
were to be drawn.
Given this constraint, it was then necessary to develop clear criteria
on the basis of which such youth could be identified and excluded from the
random selection pool. The researchers were concerned that too wide a set of
invalidating criteria would be defined by the releasing authority; in contrast,
the Board members were concerned that too narrow a set of invalidating
criteria would be defined by the researchers, thus allowing an unacceptably
broad spectrum of youth the chance of being includelin the experimental or "no
supervision" group. To avoid a stalemate over these differing perspectives it
was necessary to negotiate a compromise.
From a number of criteria, five were finally filtered out by the Board
members as being especially troublesome. These remaining criteria were then
used to exclude youth from the study pool: (1) officially known involvement in
an act of arson, (2) officially known involvement in an act of rape; (3)
formal
diagnosis of 'severe emotional disturbance', (4)parole to a living situation
other than to the legal parental home, (5) a consistent record of assaultive
behaviors. While each of these criteria reflect some degree of vagueness,
they were seen by the researchers as reflecting the best compromise that could
be developed under existing conditions.
A second major issue that had to be negotiated with the paroling authorities prior to the implementation of the project was that of determining the
exact nature of parole for the experimental and control groups. The investigators preferred that the experimental group members be given flat release
from the institutions to eliminate the possible confounding effect of parole
status, itself. The design of the research would simply involve first assessing whether or not prospective parolees met the study criteria and second,
given that these were met, randomly assigning them to either the conventional
parole supervision group or to the experimental group - the members of which
would be provided with outright discharges upon release from the institution.
With the intruding factor of 'parole' eliminated for the experimental group,
the potential effects of parole supervision as compared to no parole supervision could be accurately and fairly easily assessed.
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Because standing policy dictated against flat
release from institutions
for juveniles, the members of the Youth Commission felt that they could not
accept this proposal. As a result, parole had to remain a constant for both
study groups with modifications made around the relative degree of supervision
received while on this status. Because the conventional parole agreement
stipulated conditions requiring the parolee and parole agent to maintain
contact, a modified parole agreement form had to be developed by the investigators for those youth assigned to experimental status. The major modification
made was to eliminate the requirements for parole agent-parolee contact.
Clearly, however, ethical requirements demanded that in a somewhat subjectively
defined 'crisis', the youth would have the option of contacting the parole
officer. As a consequence, procedures had to be developed for monitoring
parole contacts made by members of the experimental and control groups.
Once the issues of defining excluding criteria and maintaining the fact
of parole as a constant were dealt with, the eventual size of samples had to
be negotiated. These issues were all inter-related inasmuch as the specified
criteria would directly affect the proportion of all released from the two
institutions that could be assigned to either the experimental or control
groups.
Thus, if the five criteria eliminated a large proportion of the total
number of released from possible inclusion in these study groups, the time
period set for obtaining a sizeable sample would be considerably lengthened.
Compounding this problem was a lack of information on the proportion of youth
being released from the relevant institutions falling within the five study
criteria.
For similar reasons the members of the Parole Board, the administrators
of the parole division and the administrators of the institutions were concerned
with this question. The Board members were not prepared to sanction a study
which would take an interminable length of time to complete.
Furthermore,
agency administrators were not disposed to tolerate research-caused disruptions
in the normal routine of their programs for any prolonged period of time.
As
a result of these considerations a ten-month follow-up period was agreed upon.
While this follow-up was far too short to obtain information n all
sample
members who would eventually return to correctional settings,
it did cover the
average length of the parole period for juveniles in the state.
A more pervasive type of public relations issue had to be dealt with
once the above questions had been resolved.
During the initial
planning
stages, the Board members and the administrators of the parole division had
raised persistent concerns about the manner in which local police and juvenile
court officers were to be informed about the proposed investigation. In
particular, concern was expressed about the possibility of generating negative
reactions from these local officials if the proposed study were conducted
without their explicit approval.
To handle this problem the Board members suggested that a description
of the proposed study be provided to local police and court officials prior to
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initiating the research ffort. The rationale for proceeding in this way was
to provide local authorities with an opportunity to react to the study before
The investigators, on the other hand, were wary.
it was formally implemented.
They saw the suggestion as a catalyst stirring up negative sentiment among
local officials and possibly undermining or even aborting the project before
it got off the ground.
As a less disasterous alternative, the researchers proposed that
following the actual implementation of the study, copies of a form letter
describing the research be provided to each parole officer in the state who
would then be free to use his own personal discretion in providing it to the
local police and court authorities. Proceeding in this way had several
advantages. First, because the local parole officers would be better able
to assess potential reactions to such a letter, they would be in a better
position to make an informed judgement about making it available. Also,
informing local officials after the actual initiation of the project might
discourage - if not eliminate - action to terminate it since they would be
faced with a fait accompli. Furthermore, since the field agent was closely
involved with these local officials, there would be a greater opportunity to
explain on a more intimate basis those issues which were seen as requiring
further clarification. Finally, the process of having the parole officer
explain the nature of the study to these local officials was expected to
diminish the possibility of the research being interpreted as a case of
local youth being "victimized" through "depriving" some of them of parole
services.
After frequent and lengthy discussions with the members of the Parole
Board and the administrators of the parole division, this issue was resolved
After the first
monthly group
in the manner proposed by the investigators.
had been randomly assigned, the parole officers were equipped with form
letters which at their own discretion they provided to local authorities.
The low probability of field agents having an experimental group member
assigned to their caseload was a point that was forcefully stressed in this
material.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INSTITUTIONS
Upon receiving the formal consent of the Parole Board for the conduct
of the proposed study, the investigaors contacted the administrators of the
two institutions which were to function as sample selection sites and received
A series of meetings were then conducted
tentative assurances of cooperation.
with the supervisory and administrative staff members at these institutions in
order to deal with the kinds of demands that this study would place upon the
staff. The content of these discussions ranged from very practical concerns
such as the use of the study instruments and procedures to be followed in
informing the field agent of a youth's assignment to the experimental group,
to the more general question concerning the extent to which the research itself
Generally, staff
might conflict with the service orientation of the staff.
members at both institutions could agree with the proposed conduct of the
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study but not unreservedly. There were still major reservations about the
possible compromise of service goals.
Specifically, the sets of priorities under which the staff at the
institutions operated were viewed as conflicting with thR research being
proposed. The practitioner concern with what
Wright has called a
"strategy of activity" which was manifested in providing service to youth
committed to their care, was seen by some staff members as antithetical to
a "strategy of research".
This concern was most graphically expreseed by a
few who indicated that they felt the researchers were "playing dice" with
human lives by randomly assigning children to experimental and control groups.
This statement seemed to reflect a nagging concern over the conflict between
providing services to young people and evaluating the effects of such
services; the choice presumably priori ized as one of helping young people as
against gathering information on them.
From the researcher's perspective,
however, the conflict was more apparent than real. For without adequate
information and testing, there would seem to be little
to ensure that the
service being provided was really a "service" or that the help being offered
was actually helping anyone - assumptions which the practitioners adhered to
in defending the service priority.
Another problem was to develop ways to gear the random selection
procedures of the study design in with the administrative procedures of the
two institutions without either violating the design or grossly 6 interfering
with the normal administrative functioning of the institutions.
By working
closely with the pertinent administrative staff at the two institutions, this
problem was resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both the researchers and
the staff members.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FIELD STAFF
Concurrent with the meetings held with the administrative staff at the
pertinent institutions and those with the Parole Board over a six-week period
prior to the formal initiation of the study, meetings were arranged with all
supervisory and administrative staff members in the parole division.
The
initial meeting held with representatives from this Division involved the
researchers and the four top administrative staff members. The general nature
of the proposed study as well as the procedures to be followed as those
related to parole supervision were presented and discussed. Once general
approval was received at this meeting, sessions were scheduled with each
supervisory staff member throughout the state.
The purpose of meeting with supervisory staff members was explicitly
to provide information on the proposed research and solicit reactions to the
kinds of problems that could be anticipated as arising during the conduct of
the study. Questions relating to the general design of the study were not a
major concern at these meetings; however, questions on the specific procedures
as to how experimental group members were to be handled by the individual
parole officers did arise. How, for example, would agents handle the common
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returning parolees be accompanied to school by the
school requirement that all
parole officer? Now would placement plans formulated at the institution
prior to release be affected by assignment to experimental status? How would
"contacts" be defined? Not unexpectedly, field also wanted a clear understanding of how they were to be notified of the youth's placement in the experimental group as well as how the family was to be notified of such placements.
Finally, questions were raised regarding the amount of extra work which would
be involved for the agent in handling experimental cases and how to deal with
the anticipated community pressures from law enforcement, court, or school
officials over not actively supervising certain parolees.
These questions required clear responses on a practical level, an
expression of understanding by the investigators of the kinds of problems the
study would create for these staff members, along with a clearly expressed
willingness to help whenever possible in resolving difficulties. The cooperation and active assistance of the field agents, which was crucial for the
conduct of the research, was not likely to be forthcoming if the researchers
were seen as callously shoving problems off on them without actively involving
themselves in working toward mutually satisfying solutions.
Some of the questions presented at these meetings may have been prompted
While not explicitly stated as such, the thrust of
by an underlying concern.
the proposed investigation was likely perceived as a test of the competency of
Similarly, the roles of the evaluators seemed to be viewed
the field staff.
The fact that the Parole Board and
as those of inspectors or management spies.
top administrators of the parole division had given their sanction did little
to minimze the problem, in fact, their interest in this study may have exacber
To help reduce tension, the investigators found it necessary to
ated it.
explain repeatedly who they were, what their intentions were, and what the
potential implications of the research might be in terms of the role and
Moreover, attempts were made to underscore the
function of the field agent.
idea that the program's impact was the focus of evaluation and not the individWhile anonymity was assured, the
ual practitioner's ability or competence.
mere fact of conducting the study nonetheless constituted a threat by calling
into question a rather basic assumption: namely, does parole supervision have
an effect on the further delinquent behavior of young people?
Of great help in overcoming these sources of resistance was one of the
researcher's prior work experience in the Department of Corrections, and
consequently, his familiarity with many of the parole staff. Perhaps because
of this, he was not perceived so much as a stranger coming into the setting
from the alien world of the university but more as a former colleague who
could be expected to have some appreciation of, and sympathy for, the difficulties of the parole officer role.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE PAROLE BOARD IN THE CONDUCT OF THE STUDY
A number of problems directly involving the parole board arose during
A minor but pervasive problem concerned the onthe course of this project.
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institutions
going articulation of the random selection procedures at the t
with the mutual tasks of the institutional staff and the parole board members
at the time of the parole hearings.
Other concerns developed around the availability of the random assignment schedules to either the members of the parole board or institutional
staff and the possible slippage of the agreed-upon study criteria. To protect
against these concerns becoming serious problems, careful monitoring by the
researchers was required on an on-going basis.
As indicated previously, the conduct of this research tended to place
local parole officers in a difficult position relative to the local police
and court authorities. This was most obviously the case in rural communities
where the local police and court tried to remain closely involved in the
general progress of a youth released back to the community on parole. On a
number of occasions the fact that a parolee was returned on an unsupervised
basis seems to have been interpreted by these local officals as a threat to
their authority over the local county probation officer and, ultimately, over
the youth he was supposed to serve.
For example, over the course of the third and fourth months of the
study, a number of letters were received from county probation officers who
had experimental group members assigned to their caseloads.
These letters
tended to express concerns around the methods used in assigning youth to the
experimental group as well as the lack of involvement on the part of the local
juvenile court judge in planning and the research.
Reinforcing these letters
were similar types of concern communicated by local judges directly to parole
supervisors and administrators.
These individually communicated concerns were more forcefully brought
to our attention approximately six months after initiating the study. At a
regular meeting of Juvenile Judges from throughout the State, the Chairman of
the Parole Board who "happened" to be present was questioned about the nature
of the assignments made to the study and, in particular, why the Judges had not
been informed prior to beginning the research. As a result of apparent concern
over maintaining a good working relationship with the jurists, this official
proposed that the investigatorsmeet with each juvenile judge in the State and
inform him of the nature and purpose of the study. The implication was clear
that if further concerns were raised by the Judges, modifications would have
to be made in the procedures used for assigning youth to the study groups.
While politically expedient, this suggestion was unrealistic in view of the
excessive travel time that would be required. The message, however, was
quite clear; this was the first real indication that the Parole Board was
prepared to terminate the study in response to pressure from influential
publics.
Never completely resolved, this issue was diminished somewhat by the
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researchers agreeing to provide the Judges with cupies of all information
pertinent to the study. Because, in most cases, they had already received
this material from the local parole officer, this procedure simply amounted
to providing them with an additional copy.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE PAROLE STAFF AND INSTITUTIONAL STAFF IN THE CONDUCT OF
THE STUDY
The investigators attempted to maintain continuous contact with parole
staff over the life of the project. To accomplish this, reports providing
general information on the conduct of the study were sent out to all staff on
a monthly basis. These reports noted the kinds of problems various parole
officers encountered and pointed out possible ways in which they might be
handled.
The problems that arose at the institutions during the conduct of the
research were minor. These included an occasional failure of the institutional
staff members to contact the designated parole officers after the parole
hearing to inform them of a particular youth's placement in the experimental
group and an occasional clerical error in failing to notify the family of a
youth's placement in the experimental group.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Planning and conduct. The process of planning, negotiating, and conducting this evaluative research study presented a number of problems that
went beyond the purely technical considerations of research design and analysis,
Among the most crucial and exacting of these were integrating the 'strategy of
research'concerns of practitioners and the political and administrative
concerns of the Parole Division, institutional settings, and the Parole Board.
The most difficult and persistent problem was thus to maintain a balance
between ensuring that the research would not be severely compromised and the
functioning of the various administrative components unncessarily disrupted.
Herzog, for example, has described the process of blending scientific rigor
with clinical and administrative practicality as resembling an act of love
...
in the fact that it is vastly written abou and yet when it happens
to a person it feels new, unexpected, uncharted."
In order to help avoid some of the potential pitfalls of conducting a
field experiment of this magnitude, it was crucial to have a clearly articulated initial working agreement between the researchers and the administrative and service components relevant to the study. A clear understanding of
the kind of constraints bearing on the research in relation to what could and
what could not be done had to be specified. In turn, the constraints bearing
on the clinicians and administrators had to be acknowledged and handled within
the limits of the research design. Specifically, it was necessary to deal with
political constraints involving groups such as the Probate and Juvenile Court
Judges and policy constraints relating to the institutions and field services
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components of the Department of Corrections and the Parole Board. Without
deliberate planning along with a mutual sense of trust between the relevant
bodies and the investigators, the project may well have been aborted on
several different occasions. Involved here was the importance of the investigators providing administrators and practitioners with assurances of their
technical competency, ther understanding of the agency setting, as well as
their personal integrity.
Findings and utilization. A major finding of this research was that assigning
cases on the basis of providing differential exposure to parole supervision
does not have a significant paitive effect upon the parole adjustment of
juvenile-aged boys and girls.
Within the group of boys, significantly more
control group members as compared to their experimental counterparts had
parole revoked during the ten-month follow-up. Furthermore, with regard to
girls, a similar but not statistically significant tendency was apparent.
Unplanned for and unexpected findings included sex-related differentials
in treatment afforded juveniles as well as the amount and perceived quality
of help sought out and received by juvenile parolees in the community. With
regard to the former, it was found that girls as compared to boys experienced
fewer opportunities to remain within the local community either on probation
status or in county-operated institutional settings and were committed to the
state-level Youth Commission and subsequently placed in state operated correctional settings at a younger age and for the commission of less serious types
of offenses. In terms of the provision of help within the community context,
it was found that close relatives and peers as compared to more professionally
defined 'helping sources' were most frequently indicated as people with whom
problems were discussed and the fact of experimental status did not significantly relate to either the type of people sought out for help, the frequency
they were sought out, or the extent to which they were defined as helpful.
The major conclusions were included in a summary of the project which
was distributed to all parole officers, supervisors and administrators, as
well as to the members of the Parole Board. In conjunction with this summary
of the project findings, the investigators communicated their willingness to
meet with and discuss the programmatic implications of the research.
Unfortunately, no response to this offer was ever made by either the practitioners, supervisors or administrators of the parole division or by the
members of the parole board. Almost totally ignored, the project became in
effect, a "non-study" - left to gather dust on a shelf.
Approximately a year after the completion of the study a new administration was appointed to the Department of Corrections. An attempt was made
by a new Deputy Commissioner to have the findings of the project discussed
and the implications for the delivery of parole services examined. The major
focus of discussion by parole supervisors soon came to be the adequacy of the
methodology used. Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner contracted with an
outside researcher to write a critical appraisal of the study including the
methods used and the plausibility of the findings. Faced with a positive
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assessment of the study, the supervisors were left with the recourse of making
veiled charges of unethical behavior on the part of the researchers along with
further methodological nitpicking.
Even with the strong support of the Deputy Commissioner, little
more
came of using the study findings for the more effective and efficent delivery
of parole supervision.
Why did the findings of this project have so little direct impact on
the relevant administrative units? This question is particularly intriguing
in view of the excellent cooperation and high degree of trust maintained
between the investigators and the administrative, supervisory and line-level
parole staff during the course of the project.
A primary reason may have
been the initial
failure on the part of the researchers and the pertinent
organizational units to explore and make explicit what each party saw the
purpose of the slydy to be, particularly in relation to functional programmatic decisions.
While the researchers viewed the major purpose of the
proje.; to be a rigorous test of the validity assumption parole supervision,
the relevant organizational units seemed to view the study as one of documenting what they already 'knew' to be true about the program.
Negative
results were neither seriously entertained by the Parole Board nor raised as
a highly probable outcome by the researchers.
In turn, the program implications were never dealt with. Consequently, when the negative results were
demonstrated, there was no commitment on the part of the parole staff to
make modifications in the manner in which services were being delivered.
Added to this lack of commitment was a state of uncertainty over what changes
would be required in order to more effectively achieve organizational goals.
Thus, while the researchers clearly demonstrated that parole efforts were
largely ineffective, the effort was of little
help in charting clear alternative courses of action.
Attention had not been paid in advance to contingency
planning of the different ways the results conceivable could turn out as
well as the ways in which each set of alternative findings could lead to modifications in the delivery of parole services.
Thus, while program personnel
might have been able to accept the general accuracy of the findings the
substantive implications for using the results to modify service delivery
patterns were ambiguous.
Program people were left
in the untenable position
of either concluding that parole services as presently being provided were
totally ineffective or that the research was in error.
Being unwilling to
conclude the former, they chose the latter course and, as a consequence,
disregarded the conclusions which were obtained.
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The literature on this issue is vast inasmuch as it constitutes a
distinctive feature of evaluation research. See in particular:
Hyman Rodman and Ralph Kolodny, "Organizational Strains in the
Researcher-Practitioner Relationship," in Alvin Gouldner and S.M.
Miller, editors, Applied Sociology, New York, the Free Press, 1965,
pp. 93-113; Peter H. Rossi, "Evaluating Social Action Programs,"
Trans-Action, 4, 1967, pp. 51-53; Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative
Research , New York, Russell Sage, 1967, esp. pp. 151-166; John
Mann, "Technical and Social Difficulties in the Conduct of Evaluative
Research," in Francis G. Caro, editor, Readings in Evaluation Research
New York, Russell Sage, 1971, pp. 175-184.
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See; Gene Kassebaum, David Ward, Daniel Wilner, Prison
Treatment and Parole Survival, New York, John Wiley, 1971, esp.
p. 212.
John C. Wright, "Curiosity and Opportunism", Trans-Action, 11,
Jan-Feb, 1965, pp. 38-40.
For an incisive treatment of this problem in the evaluation of a
social wlfare agency see:
Sidney H. Aronson and Clarence C. Sherwood
"Researcher Versus Practitioners:
Problems in Social Action Research,
"Social Work, October, 1967, pp. 89-96.
See:
Edward A. Suchman, "Action for What? A critique of Evaluative
Research," in Carole H. Weiss, Ed., Evaluating Action Programs:
Readings in Social Action and Education, Boston, Allyn and Bacon,
1973, pp. 52-84.
On this point of the definition of the researcher, see; Rensis Likert
and Ronald Lippitt, "Utilization of Social Science," in L. Festigger
and D. Katz, editors, Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences,
New York, Holt, 1953, p. 611.
Elizabeth Herzog, Some Guide Lines for Evaluative Research,
Washington, U.S. Department of Health, Eduaktion and Welfare, 1959,
p. 88. More specifically on this point with referenee to correctional
settings, Cressey has clearly described the conflicts faced by correctional workers in formulating their attitudes toward evaluation research and has noted that while these workers are supposed to be in
favor of such research they recognize that the findings may threaten
the continued existence ofttheir program. See: Donald R. Cressey,
"The Nature and Effectiveness of Correctional Techniques, "Law and
Contemporary Problems, Autumn, 1958, pp. 754-771.
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Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1972, p. 119.
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